The Oil & Gas and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting to Happen by Shade, Joseph
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 4 Mineral Law Symposium 
Summer 1995 
The Oil & Gas and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting to 
Happen 
Joseph Shade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting to Happen, 30 Tulsa L. J. 599 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 30 Summer 1995 Number 4
THE OIL & GAS LEASE AND ADR:
A MARRIAGE MADE IN HEAVEN
WAITING TO HAPPEN
Joseph Shadet
I. INTRODUCrION .......................................... 601
II. THE OIL & GAS LEASE ................................. 603
A. The Basic Nature of the Oil & Gas Lease ........... 603
1. The Interests Created by the Oil & Gas Lease. 604
2. The Underlying Business Deal .................. 605
3. The Basic Expectations of the Lessor and
Lessee .......................................... 605
B. History and Evolution of the Modem Oil & Gas
Lease ............................................... 606
1. In General ...................................... 606
2. Some Examples of Evolution ................... 607
a. The Modem Habendum Clause and
Tim eline .................................... 607
b. Savings Clauses ............................. 608
c. The Operations Clause ..................... 609
d. The Pooling and Pugh Clauses .............. 610
C. Current Structure of the Modern Oil & Gas Lease.. 611
D. Implied Covenants .................................. 612
t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D. 1960, University of
Texas. The author practiced primarily in the areas of Corporate/Securities and Oil & Gas prior
to joining the faculty of Texas Wesleyan in 1990. Professor Shade gratefully acknowledges the
contribution of his research assistants Dayna Ferebee and David Couch.
1
Shade: The Oil & Gas and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting to Happe
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
E. The Need for Further Evolution ..................... 613
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL ADR PROCEDURES. 614
A. Consensual Procedures .............................. 615
B. Adjudicative Procedures ............................ 616
C. Other ADR Procedures-Variations and Hybrids ... 618
D. Mediation Appears the Best ADR Procedure for
Resolving Lessor/Lessee Disputes ................... 619
IV. IHARACTERISTICS WHICH SUPPORT RESOLUTION OF
DISPUTES THROUGH MEDIATION ....................... 620
A. Disputes Between Parties Who Have a Continuing
Relationship ......................................... 621
B. Disputes in Which the Best Solution Involves
Remedies Courts Cannot Provide ................... 623
C. Where the Parties Want to Retain Control Over the
Resolution of Their Dispute ......................... 623
D. Where the Parties Want a Forward-looking
Resolution of the Dispute ........................... 624
E. Where Privacy and Confidentiality are Important ... 625
F. Where the Parties Have Differing Assessments of the
Law and/or the Facts ................................ 626
G. Where the Parties Want to Minimize Time and
Costs ................................................ 627
H. Mediation Appears to be the Process of Choice ..... 628
V. THE MEDIATION PROCESS .............................. 628
A. How to Initiate Mediation ........................... 628
B. Role of the Mediator ................................ 629
C. Overview of Mediation Techniques and Mediator
Qualifications ....................................... 630
D. Overview of the Steps in Mediation Process ......... 632
E. Desirability of Mediation-Business and Practical
Considerations ...................................... 635
VI. THE USE OF MEDIATION IN RESOLVING LESSOR/LESSEE
D ISPUTES ............................................... 636
A. Types of Lessor/Lessee Disputes .................... 636
B. Models Illustrating the Use of Mediation in
Resolving Lessor/Lessee Disputes ................... 638
1. Surface Damage Dispute ....................... 638
2. Lease Termination Dispute ..................... 641
VII. COMPULSORY MEDIATION CLAUSE ...................... 645
A. A Suggested Form of Clause ........................ 645
[Vol. 30:599
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss4/1
THE OIL & GAS LEASE AND ADR
B. Administrative Support Structure .................... 646
C. Enforcement of Dispute Resolution Clauses ......... 646
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................... 648
EXHIBIT A. Modern Form of Oil & Gas Lease .............. 650
EXHIBIT B. Old Form of Oil & Gas Lease .................. 656
I. INTRODUCION
The main question explored by this paper is why and how alter-
nate dispute resolution ("ADR") can be utilized effectively to resolve
disputes between lessors and lessees which arise under an oil and gas
lease. The answer requires a basic understanding of both the oil and
gas lease and ADR.
Pursuant to an oil and gas lease, the central document to oil and
gas exploration and development, a person who owns land' which an
oil company desires to develop for oil and gas leases that land to the
oil company. The landowner, as lessor, authorizes the oil company, as
lessee, to conduct operations on the landowner's land at the oil com-
pany's sole risk and expense. In return, the landowner receives cer-
tain consideration consisting primarily of a bonus and royalty.2
The oil and gas lease creates a relationship between the lessor
and lessee which may last for generations.3 The long term expecta-
tions of both the lessor and lessee are the same-the expectation of
profit from oil and gas production. The business deal, evidenced by
the oil and gas lease, is structured so that if a good well or wells are
developed on the leased property both the lessor and lessee will
profit. However, the intermediate interests and goals of the lessor and
lessee tend to be quite different. Thus, disputes between lessees and
lessors often arise. Such disputes are often resolved through litiga-
tion, which is costly, time consuming, and often harmful to the long
term relationship between lessors and lessees.
1. This paper assumes that the landowner owns both the surface and the minerals underly-
ing his land. This is not always the case since mineral ownership can be severed from surface
ownership. EUGENE 0. KuNTZ ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS
11-15 (2d ed. 1993).
2. See infra part II.A, particularly note 16. The amount of the royalty and bonus are mat-
ters negotiated between the lessor and lessee. The amount of each may vary widely depending
on the desirability of the land in question as a prospect for oil and gas development.
3. On the other hand, the relationship may last a relatively short time. The modem oil and
gas lease may terminate on its first anniversary date if the lessee fails to pay delay rentals or it
may last as long as there is production in "paying quantities" from the property covered by the
lease. See infra part II.B.2.a.
1995]
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ADR is the use of a neutral third party to facilitate resolution of
disputes outside of a formal court of law.4 This broad definition in-
cludes a wide range of procedures which can be used separately or in
various combinations. The principal distinguishing factor among the
various ADR procedures is whether the neutral third party has the
power to impose a solution on the disputants or merely assists the
disputants in arriving at their own solution. Procedures in which solu-
tions are imposed are called adjudicative procedures. 5 The prime ex-
ample is arbitration. Procedures in which the parties, assisted by the
neutral third party, work out their own solutions are called consensual
procedures.6 The prime example is mediation. There are also a
number of hybrid procedures which combine elements of both arbitra-
tion and mediation.'
The broad-based advocacy over the past two decades for in-
creased use of arbitration, mediation, and other ADR procedures in
resolving disputes is often called the alternative dispute resolution
movement. It is a movement based primarily on practical rather than
philosophical considerations. Today's legal system is burdened by an
overly litigious society and by a proliferation of laws designed to regu-
late business, ensure civil rights, and protect consumers. The result
has been a litigation explosion which has clogged our courts and
caused many experts to suggest alternatives to litigation.'
Although various forms of alternate dispute resolution have been
used for centuries, with the exception of traditional arbitration long
used in certain industries such as securities and traditional mediation
of labor disputes, ADR was not extensively used as a tool for resolv-
ing business disputes until the early 1980s. 9 Today, however, ADR is
widely used in resolving business disputes and has as much general
support as any process in our legal system.' °
4. HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATE DiSPUTE RESOLUTION 28 (Amy L. Greenspan ed., 2d ed.
1990) [hereinafter TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK].
5. CENTER FOR PUBLIc REsouRcEs, MODEL ADR PROCEDURES IN TECHNOLOGY Dis.
puTEs 7 (1993) [hereinafter CPR-TECHNOLOGY DispuTEs].
6. Id. at 2.
7. See infra part III.C.
8. More than 15 million lawsuits are filed every year in the United States. Between 1964
and 1984 the per capita rate at which law suits were filed tripled. See PETER LoVENHEIM, MEDI-
ATE, DON'T LITIGATE 3 (1989).
9. SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DIsPuTE RESOLUTION IN
AMERICA 47-49, 134-35 (1988) (providing a short background of arbitration and mediation
respectively).
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Why has ADR become so popular? Quite simply, because it
works. As former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger put it, lawyers
would recommend litigation less frequently if they remembered that
"[p]eople with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they
want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible."" ADR is often the
least costly, most expeditious, and most effective way of resolving dis-
putes. In disputes arising under an oil and gas lease it can be more
than that. It is often the best means of preserving existing relation-
ships, fashioning appropriate forward looking remedies, and giving
the parties maximum control over the resolution of their disputes.
Despite the strong momentum of the ADR movement and the
suitability of ADR procedures for resolving disputes between lessors
and lessees, 2 the oil and gas industry has been slow to embrace ADR
as a means of resolving disputes.13 In the near future, both oil compa-
nies and landowners will come to view ADR and the oil and gas lease
as a marriage made in heaven. Lease forms will be amended to in-
clude a compulsory ADR clause and ADR will become an everyday
part of the oil and gas business.
II. Tim OIL & GAS LEASE
To understand how ADR procedures can be employed effectively
to resolve disputes between parties to an oil and gas lease, one must
understand certain basics regarding the oil and gas lease and the rela-
tionships and expectations it creates.
A. The Basic Nature of the Oil & Gas Lease
The oil and gas lease is not a lease in the traditional landlord/
tenant sense. 4 Rather it is a legal instrument which documents a
unique business transaction and creates a unique set of relationships.
The oil and gas lease has been described as follows:
11. Warren E. Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, 16 JUDGES J. 22, 49 (1977).
12. See infra part IV. See also CNrR FOR PuBLIc RESouRCEs, ADR FOR OIL AND GAS
INDUSTRY Disptrrs (1991) [hereinafter CPR-Oa AND GAS].
13. This is not to suggest that oil companies do not use ADR. Arbitration is extensively
used in international operations. Many contracts made by oil companies have ADR clauses and
parties to a lease or contract often willingly submit to mediation or arbitration after litigation is
instituted. While anecdotal evidence abounds as to the non-use of ADR to resolve disputes
between lessors and lessees arising under domestic oil and gas leases, to this writer's knowledge
no empirical studies on this point currently exist.
14. Oil and gas leases differ from ordinary real property leases in that the lessee: (1) has the
right to use the land and to take substances of value from it; (2) is not limited to a specific term
of years; and (3) must share usage rights with the surface owner. Jomi S. LowE, OIL AND GAS
LAW IN A NUTsHELL 171-72 (2d ed. 1988).
1995]
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[The oil and gas lease is] both a conveyance and a contract....
A conveyance because it is the instrument under which the mineral
owner conveys a right to an oil company to explore for and produce
oil and gas.... A contract because the oil company accepts the right
to explore and produce burdened by certain express and implied
promises.
The key to understanding the oil and gas lease is to remember
that it's a business transaction. A mineral owner, who generally
lacks the capital or expertise to explore or develop, transfers those
rights to an oil company (reserving a royalty interest in production).
Both parties expect to make a profit from the transaction and the
lease sets out their bargain.' s
In other words, pursuant to the oil and gas lease, a person who
owns land ("landowner") leases his or her land to an oil company,
which has the capital and technology to develop the land for oil and
gas. The landowner, as lessor, authorizes the oil company, as lessee,
to conduct operations on his land at the oil company's sole risk and
expense. In return, the landowner typically receives an initial cash
payment on signing the lease, called a bonus, and a share of produc-
tion in any oil and gas produced from his land, called a royalty.' 6
1. The Interests Created by the Oil & Gas Lease
The oil and gas lease is both a conveyance of property rights from
the lessor to the lessee and an executory contract between such par-
ties. 17 The lessee's interest in the mineral estate is commonly called
the working interest.'" The working interest lasts as long as the lease
lasts. In other words, as long as the lease is in effect the lessee has an
exclusive right to explore for and develop oil and gas on the property
subject to the lease. In addition to his/her surface rights and payments
15. KuNTz, supra note 1, at 138-39.
16. Royalty can be defined as a share of oil and gas produced from the land, free from the
cost of production. LowE, supra note 14, at 44. Royalty is often used as a means of compensa-
tion in ventures in which value is highly speculative. In addition to oil and gas ventures royalties
are often used in media or publishing ventures. Another type of payment sometimes received by
the lessor is delay rentals. A delay rental is a sum of money paid by the lessee to the lessor for
the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations during the primary term of
the lease. See HowARD R. VIr.AMs & CI-ai..ns J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 299 (8th ed. 1991).
17. Louis G. MOSBURG, JR., LANDMAN'S HANDBOOK ON BASIC LAND MANAOEMENT
§§ 3.02(a), 3.04(a) (1978).
18. WriLLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, at 1377. Such interest is also sometimes called the
leasehold interest or the operating interest. All mean essentially the same thing.
[Vol. 30:599
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or fights to payment received in consideration for executing the lease,
the lessor retains a right of reversion in the mineral estate.19
2. The Underlying Business Deal
Exploration and production of oil and gas require the combina-
tion of three basic elements-land, capital, and technology. The oil
company presumably has the capital and technology. The landowner
has the land, which is the "raw material" that oil companies need for
oil and gas development. The oil company does not want the expense
of owning the land. It does, however, want to control the land for
purposes of oil and gas exploration and development.
Under the oil and gas lease, the oil company is given the right to
develop the land for oil and gas at its sole risk and expense. In return,
the landowner or lessor receives money up front, in the form of a bo-
nus, and the expectation of more money later, in the form of royalty.
In other words, the lessor contributes the land and gives the lessee the
operating rights. The lessee contributes the financial resources and
technical know-how and assumes all of the operating risks and duties.
3. The Basic Expectations of the Lessor and Lessee
The long term expectations of both the lessor and lessee are the
same-profit from production. The deal is structured so that both the
lessee and the lessor will make money from production if one or more
good wells are developed on the property. But their intermediate
goals and expectations are quite different. The lessee wants explora-
tion rights on the land for as long a period of time as possible. The
lessee wants an option but not the obligation to drill. If production is
obtained the lessee wants to hold the lease for as long as it is profita-
ble to do so. The lessee also wants the rights to use the surface for
exploration to be as broad as possible and to pay as little as possible
for these rights. Obviously, the short term interests of the lessor, who
is basically seeking maximum royalty income and minimum interfer-
ence with the use of the surface, might conflict with those of the
19. The incidents of mineral ownership are well established and consist of the following: (1)
The development right, which includes the right to explore for and develop minerals as well as
the obligation to pay any costs of exploration and development. The development right also
includes the right to reasonable use of the surface and the right of ingress and egress, (2) The
executive right, which is the power to lease, and (3) The right to economic benefits under the
lease, usually bonus, delay rentals and royalties. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.
1986). See also Bruce M. Kramer, Conveying Mineral Interests-Mastering the Problem Areas,
26 TULSA L. 175 (1990).
1995]
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lessee. Thus a significant number of disputes occur between lessors
and lessees.20
B. History and Evolution of the Modem Oil & Gas Lease
1. In General
The oil and gas lease was developed as a special instrument to
meet the needs of both landowners and oil companies. The modern
form of the oil and gas lease evolved by trial and error over many
years. While there is no such thing as a "standard" form of lease,
various printed forms are frequently used. Exhibit A is a form of
lease frequently used in Texas, 2' which will be referred to, herein, as
the "typical" modem form of oil and gas lease to provide a framework
for reference and discussion.
The lease document evolved into its present form in response to
the needs of both the landowner and the oilman. Early oil and gas
leases were short and most were influenced by salt leases and hard
mineral leases prevalent at the time.22 An example of one of the earli-
est known leases is shown in Exhibit B. This is the lease covering the
property on which Col. Edwin Drake drilled the first oil well near
Titusville, Pennsylvania.' The entire lease consisted of a single para-
graph. It was for a term of 15 years but contained a right to renew.
The sole consideration under the lease was called rent but was really
royalty, 1/8 of the oil produced.24 Finally, the lease mandated that a
well be drilled as early in the spring season as weather would permit.
An obligation to drill was typical in early leases, because it was
thought at the time that oil was "fugacious"-constantly on the move
like an underground river or a wild animal. The idea was to capture
the oil before it moved on to adjoining land. Under the old lease
form, shown in Exhibit B, breach of the obligation to drill resulted in
forfeiture of the lease. Gradually, the oil and gas lease evolved into its
modem form.
20. See infra part VI.
21. The annotated lease form attached as Exhibit A is a slightly altered version of AAPL
Form 675, Texas Form of Oil and Gas Lease. It is probably the form most frequently used in
Texas. Other parts of the country such as Oklahoma, the Appalachian region, the Rocky Moun-
tain region and California use slightly different lease forms and, of course, the parties are free to
create their own forms in any given transaction. Current differences in the various lease forms
do not materially impact on the use of ADR to resolve disputes between lessors and lessees.
22. MOSBURG, supra note 17, §§ 1.10, 3.02(b).
23. Col. Drake's well was drilled in 1859 and oil was discovered at a depth of 69 feet.
24. This royalty was payable in kind, but the lease specified that the royalty oil could be
purchased at 45 cents per gallon. See supra note 16 for a definition of royalty.
[Vol. 30:599
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2. Some Examples of Evolution
a. The Modern Habendum Clause and Timeline
As more became known about the scientific nature of oil and gas,
it was realized that the clause which mandated immediate drilling to
capture the oil and gas before it escaped was unnecessary.' Once this
became known, the parties began tailoring leases for future rather
than immediate development. Early lease forms did not provide for
cash bonuses or delay rentals. Nor did they contain a "thereafter
clause" to keep the lease in force after the end of the primary term.
However, when the focus changed from immediate to future develop-
ment, these provisions became necessary and desirable. The lease
forms evolved accordingly. The eventual result was the modern ha-
bendum (§2 of Exhibit A) and the drilling and delay rental clauses
(§5). The net effect of these clauses was to create the timeline we
know today, which divides the term of the lease into two segments
called the primary term and the secondary term.
The Primary Term (P/T) is for a fixed number of years-three,
five or whatever number of years is negotiated. During the P/T the
lessee has the option but not the obligation to drill. However, under
the drilling and delay rental clause, the lessee must either drill or pay
delay rentals on or before the anniversary date of the lease.
The Secondary Term (S/T), created by the thereafter clause in the
habendum clause, lasts as long as oil and gas is produced in paying
quantities from the property covered by the lease.26
The timeline established by the PIT and S/T reflects the underly-
ing business deal. It gives the lessee the option but not the obligation
to explore during the P/T. If production is attained it gives the lessee
25. Today we know there are no underground rivers of oil. It exists in pore spaces of cer-
tain rock formations and remains relatively stable until the reservoir rock is penetrated with a
drill bit. Then, due to pressure from water or gas, it tends to migrate toward the opening.
26. Modem lease forms only use the term "produced." However, in recognition that the
underlying economic purpose of the oil and gas lease is to produce oil and gas profitably and that
when this can no longer be done, the lease should terminate, the courts developed the paying
quantities doctrine. Paying quantities is defined through a two-prong test. First, operating reve-
nues must exceed operating costs, without regard to recovery of drilling costs. If the first prong
is met, the second may be considered, i.e., whether a reasonable prudent operator, seeking to
make a profit, and not merely holding for speculation, would continue to operate under the
circumstances. This is judicial gloss developed by the Texas courts and now followed in the great
majority of states. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959); Garcia v. King, 164
S.W.2d 509,511-12 (Tex. 1942); see also Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545,548 (Okla. 1954); Gypsy Oil
Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329, 334 (Okla. 1926); infra part VI.B.2.
1995]
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Under early lease forms, which were in common use at least
through the 1920s, production was needed at the end of the P/T to
propel the lease into the S/T. In other words, the lessee had to drill
and establish production prior to the end of the P/T and then had to
maintain production in order to hold the lease during the S/T. Thus,
leases were sometimes terminated in situations where termination was
arguably unfair, as illustrated by Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co.28
In Baldwin, the form of lease that governed called for production
and had no savings clauses.29 The lessee was in the process of drilling
a well when the P/T ended, but was unable to complete the well and
obtain production before the end of the PIT. 30 An incredible series of
mishaps delayed completion.31 First, it did not rain enough, then it
rained too much.32 There was also mud, a blizzard, and World War I,
which caused a scarcity of materials.3 3 The court read the lease and
said production, not excuses, is needed to hold the lease during the
secondary term.34
The evolutionary response was to amend the lease form to re-
quire commencement of operations for drilling, rather than produc-
tion, prior to the expiration of the P/T. Further, over time, savings
clauses were added to the lease form to cover situations where it made
sense and was equitable to extend the lease temporarily in the absence
of actual production. The most important of the savings clauses are:
1) Dry hole, cessation of production and operations clause;35 2) Shut-
27. A modem oil and gas lease might be in effect for as short a time as one year (i.e. until
the first delay rental payment is due) or it might last for generations (i.e. so long as there is
production in paying quantities from the land).
28. 189 P. 920 (Kan. 1920).





34. Id. at 922.
35. See infra part II.B.2.c.
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in royalty clause;36 and 3) Force majeure clause.' These savings
clauses all operate as substitutes for production and will hold the lease
for a time if the lessee works diligently and in good faith to remedy
the situation which caused the delay or cessation of production.
c. The Operations Clause
Paragraph 6 of Exhibit A, the dry hole, operations and cessation
of production clause ("operations clause"), is the most complex of the
savings clauses. This clause has been modified and refined over the
years in response to three common events which delayed production,
sometimes causing lessees to lose leases prior to the advent of the
modem operations clause.
One part of the clause deals with cessation of production. If the
well ceases producing, the lessee can nevertheless keep the lease alive
if, within the time period stated in the lease (i.e. 60 days), the lessee
commences repairs. The lessee does not have to get the well produc-
ing within 60 days; he just has to start working on the problem in good
faith within the time period provided, and continue such work with
due diligence until production is restored.
The operations part of the clause deals with the situation encoun-
tered in Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co.,38 where at the end of the P/T
operations were in progress but actual production had not yet com-
menced.39 The operations portion of the operations clause now speci-
fies that the lease will not expire if operations are commenced prior to
the expiration of the P/T and continued to completion, with no cessa-
tion of operations for more than 60 consecutive days (or whatever
time period is stated in the lease). In other words, it allows the lessee
to finish what he has begun if he acts with due diligence.40
36. This is a critical clause which operates to hold a lease when the lessee completes a well
capable of producing natural gas but is unable to market the gas because there is no pipeline to
transport the gas to buyers. Under the shut-in gas royalty clause the lessee can hold the lease by
making the shut-in royalty payments required under the lease so long as he diligently and in
good faith is trying to find a market and has a reasonable probability of doing so.
37. The force majeure clause operates to save an oil and gas lease when the lessee is pre-
vented from performing (or performance is delayed) because of conditions specifically stated in
the clause. Noting the variance in the way force majeure clauses are written, Eugene Kuntz
summarizes the analytical problems encountered with such clauses as follows: "[A]pplication of
the clause can involve three separate questions: (1) is the obligation or performance covered by
the clause, (2) is the event which prevented performance described in the clause, and (3) did the
event effectively prevent performance.. .7" KUrN-z, supra note 1, at 239.
38. 189 P. 920 (Kan. 1920).
39. Id. at 921.
40. Under a clause worded slightly differently from the clause in Exhibit A (i.e. "so long as
operations are. . ."), the Texas Supreme Court construed the word operations very narrowly,
1995]
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The dry hole part of the clause covers a situation where the
lessee, while the lease is in effect, drills a dry hole but desires to drill a
second well before the lease expires.41 Exhibit A, and most modern
lease forms, contains a savings clause which provides that if the lessee
drills a dry hole, he can keep the lease alive by starting to drill another
well on the leased property within a stated period of time (i.e. 60
days).
The purpose of the operations clause is to maintain the lease in
the event of temporary delays or interruptions of production as typi-
fied by the events described above, all of which are events that lessees
may experience. The operations clause was developed to guard
against such contingencies. In modem lease forms, all three contin-
gencies are interwoven into a single clause which allows the lessee to
maintain the lease by some sort of operations, rather than production.
d. The Pooling and Pugh Clauses
Our final example in this short look at the evolution of the oil and
gas lease concerns the pooling and Pugh clauses. A pooling clause
allows the lessee to combine acreage from two or more leases together
to form spacing units. In addition, lease pooling clauses generally pro-
vide that operations for drilling or production on any acreage within
the unit will be considered operations or production from the leases
pooled. This modifies the Habendum Clause in favor or the lessee. It
also contains provisions for apportioning royalty on the basis of the
surface acres from the respective leases contained in the unit, which
modifies the royalty clause. Lessees consider pooling clauses highly
desirable since such clauses give the lessee the option of exercising the
pooling authority delegated to him by this clause, but does not require
him to do so. Absent a pooling clause in the lease, the lessee has to
get the lessor's permission to pool. This gives the lessor the power to
either deny permission to pool or charge handsomely for granting
holding that the wording of the clause in question permitted the lessee only to complete drilling
of the well started prior to the end of the primary term but not to commence drilling a second
well. Rogers v. Osborn, 261 S.W.2d 311, 314-15 (Tex. 1953). The type of clause involved in
Rogers, which today is no longer in vogue, is called a well completion clause. In response to that
holding, the clause was slightly modified to read as set forth in Exhibit A. As modified, the
clause now permits a lessee to commence a well before the end of the primary term, abandon it
after the end of the primary term, and continue to hold the lease by starting another well within
60 days. This version of the clause is called a continuous operations clause. See also LoWE,
supra note 14, at 237-40.
41. For example, the lessee obtains information from the drill core indicating that if he
moves the location 100 feet to the west, he may encounter a producing formation.
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such permission. Thus, for obvious reasons, a pooling clause is a valu-
able clause for the lessee.
For equally obvious reasons, lessors sometimes resisted signing
leases with pooling clauses. To avoid an "either-or" situation, a nego-
tiated compromise was reached in the form of the so called Pugh
clause. This clause is a lease modification which benefits the lessor.
The clause was named for Lawrence Pugh, a Louisiana lawyer who is
credited with inventing the clause. The effect of the Pugh clause is to
partially negate the pooling clause. The Pugh clause modifies the
usual pooling language to provide that operations or production from
a pooled unit will not hold the whole lease, but rather will only main-
tain the lease as to that part of the lease acreage which is actually in
the producing unit. This is a valuable clause for the lessor. The larger
his tract, the more important it is for the lessor to have a Pugh clause.
Today, Pugh clauses appear in a large percentage of modem leases.
They are another example of the evolution of the lease to meet the
needs of the parties.
C. Current Structure of the Modern Oil & Gas Lease
Over time, numerous judicial decisions, trial and error, drafting
and negotiations caused an evolution in the typical lease form from
what we began with (Exhibit B) to what we have today (Exhibit A).
The word typical is used to emphasize that there is no such thing as a
standard oil and gas lease. Exhibit A is typical in that it contains most
of the clauses customarily found in a modern oil and gas lease. That
form will be used as the basis for discussing the types of disputes that
commonly arise between lessors and lessees and how ADR may be
used to help resolve such disputes.42 The principal clauses typically
found in a modern oil and gas lease 43 are identified and briefly com-
mented upon in the annotations in the right-hand column of Exhibit
A.
42. A particular lease may or may not contain every "customary" clause. Further, the exact
wording of these clauses may vary substantially.
43. More precisely, these are actually the principal clauses in paragraph eleven of the "typi-
cal" Texas Oil and Gas Lease Form, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Other areas of the country
use leases which are similar but not identical. See supra note 21.
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D. Implied Covenants
Disputes between lessors and lessees may arise under any of the
express clauses of the lease, or they may arise under the so called im-
plied covenants. Thus, any analysis of the potential of ADR to re-
solve disputes between lessors and lessees must encompass the
implied covenants as well as the express clauses of the lease.
Implied covenants are unwritten promises that impose duties on
the lessee" and protect the lessor. They are imposed by the courts
and arise out of the relationship of the parties and the objective of the
oil and gas lease.45 Over the years the scholars and the courts have
identified and listed at least six separate implied covenants.46 These
covenants are: Protect Against Drainage, Develop, Test, 47 Explore,48
Market, and Operate Properly.
Today, there is a trend toward implying only one covenant-
namely that the lessee will act as a reasonable and prudent operator.
This unitary analysis utilizes one basic implied covenant with a
number of different applications, depending on an infinite variety of
44. There are two implied covenants that run the other way, imposing duties on the lessor
and protecting the lessee. They are the implied covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment.
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 865 (2d ed. 1993).
45. The implied covenants were created by the courts and like the express provisions of the
lease, have evolved over the years. The best way to understand implied covenants is to think in
terms of the underlying business deal, the relationship of lessee and lessor, and the expectations
of both parties. See supra part II. A. As therein noted, production is the big payoff for both
parties. The deal is structured so that both lessor and lessee will make money from good produc-
tion. The lessor contributes the land and gives the lessee all of the operating rights. The lessee
contributes the capital and know-how and assumes all operating risks. Under this type of ar-
rangement, there is an implication that the lessee knows what he is doing and that he will per-
form competently, diligently, and in good faith. It is based on the same idea as hiring someone
to build a house, repair a car, or trade securities. By virtue of being in the business of repairing
cars, building houses, or acting as a stock broker, people assume certain implied duties, namely,
that they know what they are doing and that they will do it competently, honestly and diligently.
See LOWE, supra note 14, Chapter 11.
46. Some scholars classify the implied covenants slightly differently, but the basic idea is the
same. See, e.g., RiCHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 445-47 (3d ed. 1991).
47. The implied covenant to test has been negated by the delay rental clause. Most courts
have held that the presence of a delay rental clause in the lease obviates any implied covenant to
test. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dev. Co. v. McAulay, 576 P.2d 1120 (Nev. 1978); Eastern v. Beatty,
177 P. 104 (Okla. 1918). See also HEMINGWAY, supra note 46, at 448-49.
48. The courts are split concerning the implied covenant to further explore. The Texas
Supreme Court held that no implied covenant to further explore exists independent of the im-
plied covenant of reasonable development. Sun Exploration & Prod. v. Jackson, 783 S.W,2d 202,
204 (Tex. 1989). However, under some circumstances reasonable development may carry a duty
to do some further exploration. Id. Oklahoma is in accord with this view. See Mitchell v. Amer-
ada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981). Other states recognize a covenant to further explore
separate and distinct from the covenant of reasonable development. See, eg., Gillette v. Pepper
Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). See also HEMINGWAY, supra, note 46, § 8.3.
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fact patterns. Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander 9 is a good exam-
ple of the application of the unitary analysis.
Under the unitary analysis, whether one is talking about drain-
age, development, marketing, or operations, if the lessee does what it
takes to fulfill the business purpose of the lease, as required by the
reasonable and prudent operator standard, all of the implied cove-
nants should be satisfied. Conversely, if the lessee does not act like a
reasonable prudent operator, he is likely to have breached one or
more of the implied covenants. 50
Thus, determining the duties of a reasonable prudent operator
will likely be the linchpin of any dispute involving an alleged breach of
the implied covenants. The reasonable prudent operator standard is
simply a vehicle for applying objective standards to flesh out the scope
of the lessee's duty. The reasonable prudent operator standard is
higher than the standard of good faith which is imposed on every
party to a contract. However, the reasonable prudent operator is not
a fiduciary.51 The reasonable prudent operator can act in his own self
interest, but he must also: (1) act in good faith, (2) act as a competent
operator, and (3) act with due regard for the interest of the lessor.52
E. The Need for Further Evolution
The main purpose of this brief historical look at how the oil and
gas lease evolved from something that resembled Exhibit B to some-
thing that resembles Exhibit A is recognition of the ongoing evolution
of the oil and gas lease. This evolution has been responsive to under-
lying economics, development of scientific data, refinement of the un-
derlying business deal, and, most important, the needs of the parties.
It is time for the lease document to evolve a little more. A com-
pulsory ADR clause should be added to the modern lease form.53
Before looking at the proposed new clause, we will examine the ADR
process to determine whether ADR would be a useful tool for resolv-
ing disputes which arise under the oil and gas lease. We will also de-
termine which of the various types of ADR procedures, if any, would
be best suited to helping resolve such disputes.
49. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
50. See LowE, supra note 14, at 306-09.
51. He is not a person who acts primarily for the benefit of someone else.
52. See LowE, supra note 14, at 306-09.
53. See infra part VII.
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IEI. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL ADR PROCEDURES
ADR is generally defined as the use of a neutral third party
(someone who has no stake in the outcome of the dispute) to facilitate
resolution of disputes outside of a formal court of law.54 This defini-
tion includes a broad range of procedures, which can be used sepa-
rately or in various combinations. At the most basic level, ADR
procedures can be broken down into adjudicative procedures, such as
binding arbitration, in which the neutral third party has power to im-
pose a solution on the disputants and consensual procedures, such as
mediation, in which the neutral third party merely assists the dispu-
tants in arriving at their own solution.55 The various procedures can
best be understood if viewed on a continuum ranging from purely con-
sensual to purely adjudicative. Certain procedures contain both con-
sensual and adjudicative characteristics in varying combinations.
Nevertheless, for purposes of definition and discussion, this paper
classifies the various procedures discussed as consensual or
adjudicative.56
Working definitions of the principal, ADR procedures illustrate
the breadth and flexibility of the ADR process. For example, the
Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act ("Texas ADR
Act") adopted in 1987 refers to five dispute resolution procedures. 57
The procedures include: 1) mediation, 2) mini-trial, 3) moderated set-
tlement conference, 4) summary jury trial, and 5) arbitration.5  An
earlier Act refers to a sixth, namely "private judging."59 While these
54. See KIMBERLY K. KOVACH, ADR-Does It Work?, SouTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW,
ADVANCE CIVIL LrIGATION INST. (1989).
55. CPR-TEcHNOLOGY DIsPurEs, supra note 5, at 2 & 7.
56. This distinction does not rest on whether the procedure is introduced by a court or by
the disputants but solely on the power of the neutral third party to impose a solution. For exam-
ple, a court may require the parties to mediate-a consensual procedure. The parties may have
entered into an agreement containing a compulsory arbitration clause-an adjudicative
procedure.
57. TEx. Cry. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.001-.073 (West Supp. 1995). Texas has
several other statutes which pertain to ADR. Two such statutes are the Texas General Arbitra-
tion Act, TEx. REv. Crw. STAT. ANN., art. 224 to 238-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) and the Trial
by Special Judge Act, TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 151.001-.013 (West Supp. 1995).
58. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.023-27 (West Supp. 1995).
59. See infra note 78 for legislative history of the TEXAs PRIVATE JUDGING ACT originally
enacted in 1983 and amended and recodified as Tax. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 151
(West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
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are not the only available ADR procedures, they are the six proce-
dures most often used both in Texas60 and Oklahoma.6'
A. Consensual Procedures
Mediation is most simply defined as facilitated negotiations.6'
The disputing parties attempt to negotiate a voluntary settlement of
their dispute with the help of a neutral third party (the mediator). In
mediation the disputants communicate directly with each other and
the role of the mediator is only to facilitate communication between
the parties, assist them in focusing on the issues in dispute, and gener-
ate options for settlement. The goal of mediation is for the parties
themselves to arrive at a settlement. The mediator has no power or
authority to impose a settlement. Parties may voluntarily submit their
dispute to mediation, or courts (by court order) may refer pending
cases to mediation.63 Mediation is more fully discussed below.64
Summary Jury Trial is a procedure, authorized by statute in
Texas65 and several other states, which is sometimes initiated by the
courts. Under this procedure the parties present an abbreviated ver-
sion of their case to an advisory jury selected from the regular jury
60. In addition to defining the five ADR procedures listed above, the Texas ADR Act pro-
vides for referral of cases to ADR, either on motion of the court or of a party. TEx. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a) (West Supp. 1995). The statute also gives the court authority
to appoint neutral third parties, sets standards for neutral third parties, and provides for confi-
dentiality. Id. §§ 154.021(a)(3), 154.051, 154.053 & 154.073.
61. The principal statutes which impact on ADR in Oklahoma are the Oklahoma Dispute
Resolution Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1801-1813 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) and the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). Like the
Texas Arbitration Act, the Oklahoma Arbitration Act is derived from the Uniform Arbitration
Act, versions of which have been adopted in many states. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 21 (West
1993 & Supp..1995) (the number of states adopting the Uniform Act are listed in the introduc-
tion to chapter 21). The Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act is less extensive than the Texas
ADR Act and deals only with mediation. Also it appears that mediation, generally, is used less
extensively in Oklahoma than in Texas. However, the same principles discussed in this paper
relating to the use of mediation as a tool for resolving disputes between lessors and lessees are
equally applicable in Oklahoma as well as in Texas. See generally Jane J. Welch, Mediation and
Oklahoma's New Dispute Resolution Act, 20 TULSA L.J. 114 (1984).
62. TEx. Crv. PRA. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023(a) (West Supp. 1995) ("Mediation is a
forum in which an impartial person, the mediator facilitates communication between parties to
promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding among them."). See also OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1802(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("Mediation means the process of resolving a
dispute with the assistance of a mediator outside of a formal court proceeding.").
63. Court ordered mediations are called court-annexed mediations and must be authorized
by statute. The TExAs ADR ACr authorizes court annexed mediations but the OKLAHOMA Dis-
PtrE REsOLUTION Acr does not. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023.(a) (West
Supp. 1995).
64. See infra part IV & V.
65. TEx. Crv. PRtc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.026 (West Supp. 1995).
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pool. The technique is used for "early case evaluation and develop-
ment of realistic settlement negotiations. '66 After deliberation, the
jury renders a non-binding advisory verdict. The parties and their at-
torneys then question the jurors, using the information to better eval-
uate their case. The advisory jury's verdict gives the parties a better
understanding of the risks of going to trial and thus often fosters a
negotiated settlement.67
Mini-trial is another procedure authorized by statute in Texas, in
which the parties engage in reality-testing before third parties.68 The
procedure is designed to set the stage for realistic settlement negotia-
tions. The most distinctive characteristic of a mini-trial is that the at-
torneys present their case not to a judge, arbitrator or jury, but to the
principals themselves. This process is usually used in complex corpo-
rate litigation. Attorneys for all sides present their best case to corpo-
rate executives with settlement authority, usually assisted by a neutral
third party called an "expert advisor," whose judgment all parties
trust. Negotiations by the corporate executives, usually without the
attorneys present, follow the presentation. If no agreement is
reached, the expert advisor may be asked to provide a non-binding
opinion.69
Moderated Settlement Conference is another case evaluation
process, authorized by statute in Texas, which is designed to en-
courage settlement.70 Typically, under a moderated settlement con-
ference three experienced panel members, usually attorneys, listen to
presentation of the case by all sides. The panel then questions the
attorneys as well as the clients, who are present throughout the pro-
cess. After deliberation, the panel renders an advisory, "non-binding"
evaluation of the case, which is used as the basis for further settlement
negotiation.7'
B. Adjudicative Procedures
Arbitration is defined as a "process of dispute resolution in which
a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at
66. Id.
67. See TEXAS ADR HANDBOOI, supra note 4, at 75 and LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note
9, at 23-24.
68. TEx. Civ. PRAa & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.024 (West Supp. 1995).
69. See TExAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 86; LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9,
at 114-15.
70. Moderated settlement conference is defined as "a forum for case evaluation and realis-
tic settlement negotiations." TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.025 (West Supp. 1995).
71. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 101.
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which both parties have an opportunity to be heard."'72 In modem
practice there are two types of arbitration-voluntary arbitration and
court-annexed arbitration. In voluntary arbitration the parties agree
in advance to submit their dispute to arbitration, usually pursuant to a
compulsory arbitration clause in the contract. In court-annexed arbi-
tration the courts refer a dispute to an arbitrator for decision as a
precondition or substitute for trial.73 Either voluntary or court-an-
nexed arbitration can be binding or non-binding.74
In this paper, unless otherwise expressly stated, all references to
arbitration are to binding arbitration. Non-binding arbitration is not
an adjudicative procedure, but rather a device used to foster voluntary
settlement which has more in common with the mini-trial than with
binding arbitration.75 On the other hand, binding arbitration has
much more in common with litigation than with the consensual proce-
dures described above. The dispute is submitted to a neutral, non-
governmental decision-maker called an arbitrator. The parties surren-
der control of the outcome by submitting their dispute to binding arbi-
tration. While binding arbitration is an adjudicative process like
litigation, it differs from litigation in several ways.7 6
Private Judging started in California where the procedure is com-
monly referred to as "rent a judge. ' 77 Today, several states have stat-
utes7 8 which allow the parties to refer their dispute to a privately
compensated judge for decision.79 A decision by a private judge has
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990).
73. TEx. Civ. PRAr_ & REm. CODE ANN. § 154.021 (West Supp. 1995).
74. Often, voluntary arbitration or arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in a con-
tract is binding and court annexed arbitration tends to be non-binding. However this is by no
means universally true. In Texas, court-annexed arbitration is non-binding unless the parties
stipulate to the contrary. TEx. Civ. PRA. & REm. CODE ANN. § 154.027 (West Supp. 1995).
75. It is a fact finding procedure used for the purpose of helping the parties realistically
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases.
76. See LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 47; CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 15.
The main difference between arbitration and litigation is that arbitration is confidential and pri-
vate. It is also generally more expeditious and less costly than litigation and it allows the parties
to retain some control over the process. For example, the parties may select the arbitrator and
set the standards and procedures which govern the arbitration hearing.
77. LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 21.
78. Texas first enacted a private judging statute in 1983. In 1987 the Texas Private Judging
Act was amended and recodified as TEx. Civ. PARc & REm. CODE ANN. § 151.001-.013 (West
1989). See also W. Frank Newton & David G. Swenson, Adjudication by Privately Compensated
Judges in Texas, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 813 (1984). The use of private judging is rapidly growing in
Texas. Oklahoma does not have a statute that authorizes private judging.
79. The term "private judging" is used in this paper only to refer to specific procedures
authorized by statute which permits the trial of certain types of cases by privately compensated
judges whose decisions generally carry the weight of trial court decisions and are generally ap-
pealable as such. It is not used to describe other procedures in which former judges serve as
1995]
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substantially the same status as a decision rendered by a court of law
for purposes of appeal and enforceability. Private judging, like bind-
ing arbitration, results in a resolution of the dispute. The two proce-
dures are alike in that both the arbitrator and private judge have
authority to impose solutions. Private judging differs from arbitration
in that the private judge's decision is both appealable and enforceable.
The arbitrator's award is non-appealable, except in very limited cir-
cumstances, and is enforceable only through a separate court action.80
C. Other ADR Procedures-Variations and Hybrids
The brief discussion above of the most important ADR proce-
dures illustrates the flexibility of ADR. The various procedures can be
combined, tailored, and refined in an infinite variety of ways to meet
specific needs. For example, mediation may be followed by binding
arbitration. In this scenario mediation is first employed to attempt
settlement of the dispute as a whole. If the mediation is unsuccessful,
binding arbitration follows the mediation with a different neutral third
party as the arbitrator. Any of the other procedures discussed above,
such as summary jury trial or mini-trial, may be followed by binding
arbitration. Similarly, a neutral fact finding procedure such as mini-
trial or moderated settlement conference can be employed in connec-
tion with, as well as in lieu of, mediation.8 '
Mediation followed by arbitration should be distinguished from a
hybrid procedure known as "med-arb." In a typical med-arb proce-
dure, the parties agree in advance that dispute will be mediated and
that the mediator will be given authority to arbitrate any unresolved
issues.82 While the med-arb procedure assures resolution either
through agreement or arbitrator's decision, it has a substantial disad-
vantage. The parties in mediation are not only permitted but en-
couraged, in confidential settings (i.e. caucuses) to engage in ex parte
communications with the neutral third party. Weaknesses in the case
neutrals. See generally LEEsON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 21; Charles J. Williams, Private
Judging, in TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 117-31.
80. Under the Texas Private Judging Act a verdict rendered by a privately compensated
judge is treated as a judgment that may be appealed to the same extent as any other judgment of
a Texas district court. TEx. Crv. PiP.c & REM. CODE A. § 151.013 (West Supp. 1989). See
also Texas ADR Handbook, supra note 4, 122.
81. This is the case in Texas, where all six of the ADR procedures discussed above are
authorized by statute. In Oklahoma, the options are limited to some form of mediation or
arbitration. -
82. Karen L: Henry, Med-Arb: An Alternative to Interest Arbitration in the Resolution of
Contract Negotiation Disputes, 3 OHIo ST. J. Disp. REsoL 385, 389 (1988).
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are often exposed in these sessions. The parties may be less than can-
did if they realize that when the neutral third party later takes off his
mediator's hat and puts on his arbitrator's hat, he may rule against
them.83
Another hybrid which can be very effective is the mirror image of
med-arb. For want of a better name I call it "arb-med." 4 In arb-med
the neutral third party arbitrates the dispute and has authority to
render an enforceable arbitration award. Before rendering the arbi-
tration award, the arbitrator asks the parties if prior to delivery of the
award they want to mediate the dispute and attempt to reach a volun-
tary negotiated resolution with the help of the neutral third party. If
they answer in the affirmative, the neutral third party then takes off
his arbitrator's hat and puts on his mediator's hat and attempts to me-
diate the dispute in the usual manner.85
D. Mediation Appears the Best ADR Procedure for Resolving
Lessor/Lessee Disputes
Of the various ADR procedures, mediation, either in its pure
form or in some hybrid form, is the ADR technique best suited for
resolving the disputes that arise between the lessor and lessee under
the typical oil and gas lease. The reason is simple and straight for-
ward. Mediation, unlike binding arbitration, has the disadvantage of
not ensuring that the dispute will be resolved. Its principal advantage
is that it allows the parties to work out their own solution. In most
cases both parties to the oil and gas lease prefer to resolve their own
disputes, rather than having solutions imposed on them by a judge or
arbitrator. Thus a consensual approach seems clearly preferable to an
83. Id. at 397.
84. This author has spoken to several experienced arbitrator-mediators who have success-
fully used this procedure and I have successfully used it myself in a landlord tenant arbitration.
Some neutral third parties add to the drama by placing their written arbitration award in a
sealed envelope on the table in full view of the parties while they mediate the unresolved issues.
85. The ADR procedures mentioned do not exhaust the list of hybrids and variations. See
TExAs ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 133.
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adjudicative approach for resolving disputes between lessors and les-
sees.86 For this reason the principal focus of the remainder of this
paper will be on mediation.'
IV. CHARACTERISTICS WHICH SUPPORT RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
THROUGH MEDIATION
The principal factors to consider in deciding whether disputes
arising under an oil and gas lease lend themselves to resolution
through a consensual ADR procedure such as mediation are set forth
below. In considering these factors, mediation should be compared to
both litigation and arbitration as a dispute resolving mechanism. Two
underlying concepts help put this inquiry into focus.
First, negotiation is the common element that links adjudication
with mediation and the other alternatives to litigation. Without a sys-
tem for resolving disputes through litigation, neither mediation nor
any other form of ADR would likely exist. 88 Since the threat of litiga-
tion provides the impetus for the parties to settle a given dispute, the
parties must believe that it is better to resolve a dispute through nego-
tiation rather than to have a solution imposed upon them by a court.89
86. See CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra, note 12, at 2; L.EsoN & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at
136. If mediation fails to result in a solution, litigation is always available as a last resort. Also, in
a multifaceted dispute partial solutions may result from the mediation.
87. The basic mediation process is not materially different in Texas and Oklahoma. Nor is
that process materially different in most other states. Perhaps the best way to compare media-
tion as currently used in Texas and Oklahoma is to think of it as the same process with a few
additional bells and whistles currently available in Texas.
88. All forms of ADR are alternatives to litigation. Many ADR commentators describe
adjudication as a negotiating process supplemented by coercion and note that negotiation is the
common element that links adjudication with ADR. See Bruce S. Marks, Commercial Conflict
Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Oil and Gas Industry, THm SouTHwEsT-
ERN LEOAL FOUNDATION, 41ST ANNUAL INs rr ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 91,
9-45 (Carol J. Holgren ed. 1990).
89. The best evidence that most people share this view is that over 90% of all civil lawsuits
filed are settled before judgment. See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and We Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 26-28 (1983). This same idea was more recently
expressed as follows:
In commenting on an agreed judgment in which his firm agreed to pay the plaintiff
approximately $500,000 in a case involving alleged discrimination, Mr. James Hurlock,
Chairman of white & Case, denied his firm engaged in discrimination. He character-
ized the agreed judgment as a "litigation tactic," to wit:
"The most uncertain of endeavors in life is litigation. And in a jury case it's even
more uncertain. We're a big, allegedly wealthy firm against one individual, and
we've got a Los Angeles jury."
Amy Stevens & Benjamin A. Holden, How Bigotry Charges Rocked White & Case, WALL ST. J.,
August 19, 1994, at B1.
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Second, most parties genuinely want to explore all avenues that
might lead to settlement and perceive that mediation may facilitate a
mutually acceptable settlement even though the parties themselves
may have failed to reach an agreement in unassisted negotiations. 90
A. Disputes Between Parties Who Have a Continuing Relationship
When the parties to a dispute have a continuing relationship, me-
diation is generally a better way to resolve the dispute than litigation
or arbitration.9 ' Anecdotal examples abound about parties, driven
apart by the bitterness engendered through litigation, who are unable
to cooperate on matters subsequent to the litigation even when it is in
their best interest to do so.9 The litigation itself, regardless of the
outcome, may impair or destroy a relationship, which, in the long run,
is more important than the outcome of the particular litigation.
Mediation "is far less adversarial than litigation or arbitration,
and therefore less [likely to disrupt existing] relationships."93 If the
parties are able to resolve the dispute consensually through negotia-
tions, the relationship which existed prior to the dispute may be pre-
served. In some instances, the relationship may even be strengthened
because the parties sometimes come to appreciate each other's differ-
ing points of view.94 Through mediation, each party typically gets part
of what he or she wants and often the parties come away from the
settlement with a new level of rapport and understanding. Mediation
90. "Negotiation is the ... time-honored initial step in attempting to resolve disputes." See
CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 25.
91. A retired Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, Arno Denecke, observed: " 'If
the parties are going to be in a continuing relationship after the dispute anything other than
mediation is a mistake .... Litigation can leave lasting scars, and arbitration is still confronta-
tional.' [W]ith mediation, the resolution the parties hammer out is theirs, not something imposed
by a third party." 2 ALTEmATIVE Disputr RESOLUrToN REPORT (BNA) 209 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter ADR REPORT].
92. One example is found in a well known 1917 contracts case Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102
A. 106 (Me. 1917). In that case Mrs. Hodgkin, a widow who lived on a farm in Maine, wrote
Mrs. Brackenbury, one of her children, who lived in Missouri, offering Mrs. Brackenbury the use
and income from the farm if she and her husband would move to Maine and care for Mrs.
Hodgkin for the rest of her life. Ld. at 107. The Brackenburys moved and began caring for Mrs.
Hodgkin, but the parties did not get along and Mrs. Hodgkin brought suit to force the Brack-
enburys to leave. Ild. The court held the Brackenburys had a valid contract and allowed them to
stay. Id. Following the litigation it is reported that the Brackenburys and Mrs. Hodgkin contin-
ued to live together until Mrs. Hodgkin's death in 1921 and that the relationship was unpleasant
until the very end. E.A. FARNSwORTH & W.F. YoUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COcTRA cTs
216 (4th ed. 1988). Mr. Brackenbury obtained a transcript of the law suit and would from time
to time read it to the old lady. Id.
93. CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 6.
94. Sometimes the mediation process turns adversaries into mutual problem solvers. See
Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 326 (1971).
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of one dispute may also serve as a model for resolving future
disputes.95
In the oil and gas context, the unique nature of the relationship
between lessor and lessee may offer even greater incentives than usual
for resolution of disputes through consensual means. For example,
assume 0 is the fee owner of a 160 acre farm called Blackacre. He
raises cotton and vegetables on the Blackacre farm and typically earns
an annual net profit of between $40,000 and $50,000. Assume further
that 0 has leased Blackacre to E under an oil and gas lease pursuant
to which 0 receives a 1/6 royalty and E has drilled two oil wells on
Blackacre. Each well produces on average 100 barrels of oil a day.
Under this scenario: (1) both 0 and E share the use of Black-
acre;96 (2) both operate separate businesses on the property;97 (3) 0
has an interest in the business operated by E;98 and (4) there is great
economic disparity between the revenues and profits from the busi-
ness operated by E and those from the business operated by 0. 9 9
While these factors often lead to disputes, the same factors provide
incentives for resolving the disputes consensually. The interests of 0
and E are so intertwined that there are likely to be both common
grounds and economic incentives for both parties to resolve the
dispute.
Mediation does not address who is right and who is wrong. It
avoids a clear winner and loser. It "speaks only of who will do what,"
when it will be done, and how the problem will be resolved. 100 The
"absence of fault-finding-plus the experience of working coopera-
tively" toward a mutually agreeable solution can help preserve a rela-
tionship, which adjudication might destroy.1 1
95. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 39.
96. The lessee E has the right to use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to
explore for and produce minerals. Invariably from time to time E will get in O's way.
97. E's business is the production of oil and O's business is farming.
98. His 1/6th royalty, entitles him to one of every six barrels of oil produced from the
property.
99. Assuming both wells produce 100 barrels of oil a day 360 days a year and that oil sells
for $20 a barrel, the wells will generate total revenue of approximately $1,440,000. O's royalty
share of that revenue will be approximately $240,000 a year. Assuming E's operating expenses
are $200,000 a year, which is assumed simply for purposes of making the math as simple as
possible, E still will have net profits of approximately $1 million a year from the oil business.
This is far in excess of the $50,000 maximum earned from the farm. See infra part VI.B.2.
100. LovENHniM, supra note 8, at 23.
101. Lovm, -mim, supra note 8, at 23.
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B. Disputes in Which the Best Solution Involves Remedies Courts
Cannot Provide
In many disputes the best remedies for both parties are remedies
that courts cannot provide. In business disputes generally, and dis-
putes involving oil and gas in particular, the best solution often entails
renegotiating a contract or a deal-a solution that is possible through
mediation but not through adjudication. 102 Frequently, the parties,
with the help of a mediator, can develop a "value creating" solution
which operates to the benefit of both parties. This requires coopera-
tion and can come only through a consensual mechanism.1 3 Often
such solutions involve complex trade-offs, which call for flexibility,
creativity, and negotiating skills. Sometimes one of the parties invents
a solution and then sells it to the other party. That solution is usually
then refined through further negotiations.
Mediation gives the oilman a forum for employing the negotiat-
ing and deal making skills for which oilmen are famous.1 4 The assist-
ance of the mediator in facilitating communication may help expose
the real interest or agenda of the parties, which is a vital element in
the negotiating process. While resolving disputes through mediation is
not quite like doing deals at the Petroleum Club, it has more in com-
mon with the club than the courthouse.
C. Where the Parties Want to Retain Control Over the Resolution of
Their Dispute
In most lessor/lessee disputes, the parties prefer to retain as much
control as possible over the resolution of the dispute rather than relin-
quishing such control to a judge or arbitrator. In mediation, the par-
ties control the mechanics and procedural aspects of the process, such
as where and when the mediation will occur, how the costs will be
paid, what procedural rules will be followed and similar details. The
102. Courts are limited in the types of remedies they can provide. The usual remedy is dam-
ages. Equitable remedies such as specific performance and reformation are available in limited
situations. Often none of these remedies are appropriate to resolve lessor/lessee disputes.
103. See CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 13.
104. When these skills are applied toward resolving lessor/lessee disputes, the lessor, as well
as lessee, may benefit from the oilman's creativity and deal making skills.
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parties can propose substantive solutions that make sense from a busi-
ness as well as a legal standpoint. 105 Most importantly, only the par-
ties have authority to settle the matter or advise the mediator that an
impasse has been reached.
Mediation, offers far greater flexibility and gives the parties the
opportunity to work out their own solutions. It not only permits but
also requires that the parties play a more active role than they typi-
cally play in litigation or arbitration. Most business disputes are best
resolved if they are approached as business problems with legal as-
pects rather than as legal contests. The parties must share a genuine
desire to resolve the dispute'0 6 and must accept responsibility for
resolving it, even if doing so requires one or both of them to change
their position.10 7
D. Where the Parties Want a Forward-looking Resolution of the
Dispute
"Mediation is a forward-looking process."'' 0 Unlike litigation
and arbitration which look backward to determine "who was right and
who wrong; mediation, looks [forward] to find a solution [the] parties
can live with."' 0 9 "The adjudicatory processes.., require findings of
fact about events that occurred in the past." 10 Based on those find-
ings, rights and duties are assigned and remedies imposed under appli-
cable law or the provisions of applicable documents. By contrast,
determining what happened in the past is not the central point of fo-
cus in mediation. Rather the main focus is on future conduct which
will help resolve the problem which gave rise to the dispute."'
105. They can also help structure settlements in ways most courts cannot and bring into play
negotiating and deal making skills for which some in the oil business is famous. See supra part
IV.B.
106. Ironic as it may seem, sometimes parties who say they want to resolve the dispute in fact
want to perpetuate it. LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 140.
107. LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 140-41. See also CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note
12, at 6-7.
108. LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 133.
109. LOVENHmIM, supra note 8, at 13.
110. LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 133-34.
111. See LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 133-34.
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E. Where Privacy and Confidentiality are Important
Whether the mediation is voluntarily instituted by the parties or
ordered by the court, it is a private proceeding. What occurs in a me-
diation is known only to the parties and their mediator. 112  Con-
versely, everything said or submitted in a law suit, except in rare cases,
becomes public information."13
Mediation is also confidential. Both the Texas ADR Act and the
Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act specifically provide that communi-
cations made in, and records relating to, alternative dispute resolution
procedures covered by those Acts are confidential." 4 Such communi-
cations and records are not subject to discovery and are inadmissible
in any judicial or administrative proceeding. Thus, neither the princi-
pals nor the neutral third party must testify, nor must they disclose
confidential information. In addition, the neutral third party may not
disclose confidential information to either party, unless expressly au-
thorized to do so by the party providing the information." 5 The sole
exception to the confidentiality rule is that communications or records
that would be admissible or discoverable independent of the ADR
process do not become inadmissible or nondiscoverable simply by rea-
son of their use in an ADR proceeding." 6
There are at least three aspects to confidentiality. First, when a
disputant meets with the mediator in a private "caucus" and makes
disclosures to the mediator that he would be unwilling to reveal to his
opponent, he knows the mediator will not reveal those disclosures to
the opponent without permission. Second, the disputants know that
nothing said or done during the mediation will later be used against
them in a subsequent proceeding. Third, the disputants know that the
mediator will not only refuse to testify as to anything that went on
112. See LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 133.
113. FED. R. Crv. P. 77(b) (stating in part that all trials upon the merits shall be conducted in
open court and, so far as convenient, in a regular court room).
114. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & RPri. CODE ANN. §§ 154.073 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). See also Jay F. Lapin and Roger J. Patterson, Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: New Strategies for Litigation and Settlement of Claims, Tim SOUTHwEST-
ERN LEGAL FOUNDATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRsT ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 6.04[3][a] (1990). See also Welch, supra note 61, at 120-28.
115. Tax. Crv. PRAc. & RoM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.073 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
116. Settlement discussions cannot be used as a vehicle to shield otherwise discoverable ma-
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during the mediation, but will also refuse to reveal information about
the proceeding to anyone, including family, friends or the press. 117
The principle of confidentiality in mediation rests on the broad
based policy of encouraging disputants to freely disclose information,
which aids in the resolution of disputes. Mediators also place a high
premium on confidentiality. They generally make no transcripts and
resist efforts to force them to testify or otherwise reveal informa-
tion.118 Privacy and confidentiality are generally desired in business
disputes. 19
F. Where the Parties Have Differing Assessments of the Law and/or
the Facts
Unassisted negotiations often break down because the parties
have different perceptions of the law or the facts. Parties usually base
their settlement positions on their assessment of the probable out-
come of litigation over the matter in dispute. Perceptions may differ in
this regard and it is not uncommon for each party to be unduly opti-
mistic as to its chances of success. Effective mediation is likely to lead
to a more realistic appraisal of the law and the facts by the parties and
thereby enhance the prospects for settlement. 20
Mediators can encourage exchanges of information, provide new
information, uncover the sources of the differing perceptions and ex-
pose weaknesses in either party's position. Weaknesses are usually
pointed out in confidential caucuses with each party.' 2 ' Effective
mediators can diplomatically compel the parties to face facts, per-
suade them to understand the other party's point of view, and dispel
unrealistic expectations.'
Sometimes negotiations break down or never commence simply
because the parties are too angry to communicate effectively. Also
the parties might be reluctant to initiate negotiations for fear that such
117. See NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW Poticy AND PRACTICE
(1989 & Supp. 1991). This source contains a detailed treatment of confidentiality and summa-
rizes the state laws protecting confidentiality in the mediation process.
118. See Eileen P. Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Dis-
putes, 11 CAP. U. L. REv. 181 (1982).
119. The oil and gas industry particularly seems to relish privacy and confidentiality and has
a unique term for these concepts--"tightholing."
120. See CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 14.
121. Practices and procedures vary substantially in this area: some mediators are reluctant to
express opinions while others have no hesitancy in this regard. See NANCY H. ROGERS & RICH-
ARD A. SALEM, A STuDENT's GurDE TO MEDIATION AND TmE LAW 48, 110-15 (1987).
122. CPR-Om AND GAS, supra note 12, at 8.
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an overture would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. In these situa-
tions mediators can facilitate negotiations by simply providing a neu-
tral setting and creating a positive environment. They can also
promote a productive level of communication and emotional expres-
sion, let the parties vent their anger and let them know their concerns
are understood.
G. Where the Parties Want to Minimize Time and Costs
All parties want to save time and costs. Mediation reduces both
time and costs in an overwhelming majority of cases. Studies show
that mediations which result in agreements universally resolve the
matters in dispute faster than litigation.123 Such studies show that me-
diations are typically concluded within months or weeks after initia-
tion of the mediation, which refers to the order, in the case of court
annexed mediations, or, in the case of voluntary mediations, imple-
mentation of the agreement to mediate. In the case of litigation, final
resolution typically takes years. 24 In this regard it should be noted
that, while more than approximately ninety percent of litigated dis-
putes are settled before judgement, settlement discussions do not usu-
ally get serious until a trial date is near. Thus the speed of mediation
facilitates faster settlements by forcing the parties to bite the bullet
earlier.' 5
Studies show that both time and costs are significantly reduced by
mediation. 26 Research shows that, on average, about ninety-eight
percent of a party's civil litigation costs are attorney's fees.2 7 Thus,
the means of resolving a dispute that requires the fewest hours of
work by lawyers is the least costly means of resolving that dispute. Of
course, mediators charge a fee and the parties may be represented by
attorneys in the mediation process. Costs incurred in mediation vary
widely depending on the length and complexity of mediation and
whether lawyers attend the mediation. Nevertheless, studies show
that where mediation results in agreement, costs are far less than
123. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 121, at 44. See also LOVENHErm, supra note 8, at 10(stating that "most disputes at public mediation centers can be scheduled for a hearing within
two to three weeks; average time per hearing is about one and one-half hour.").
124. The exact time of resolution varies significantly depending on local dockets and whether
or not appeals are pursued. Chicago's Cook County Circuit Court took an average of 69 months
for a case to come to trial compared with an average of 13.7 days from intake to final disposition
in New York State's 1987-88 public mediation system. LovENnErm, supra note 8, at 26-27.
125. See CPR-Busmss DispuTrs, supra note 10, at 12.
126. LovE NIM~s, supra note 8, at 10.
127. Lov-n NHsm, supra note 8, at 10.
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those incurred in litigation; and, even where mediation does not result
in agreement, costs are about the same as in cases where mediation is
not used. 28
H. Mediation Appears to be the Process of Choice
While mediation seems generally preferable to adjudication as a
vehicle for resolving lessee/lessor disputes in most cases, like any gen-
eral statement this one is subject to certain caveats and exceptions.
For example, mediation is inappropriate where one or both of the par-
ties wants to establish a precedent. Winning test cases, proving the
truth of something or establishing a precedent can not be done
through mediation because mediation agreements do not establish
right and wrong and are not binding precedents for future disputes. 129
Also, there is no guarantee that mediation will resolve the dispute. If
mediation fails, the dispute will have to be resolved through adjudica-
tion. However, since the adjudicatory options are not foreclosed if
mediation fails, there is little or no risk in mediating. 30
V. THE MEDIATION PROCESS
A. How to Initiate Mediation
There are a number of ways in which mediation may be initiated.
If the parties are in litigation, under the Texas ADR Act and similar
acts now in effect in many states, the court can order the parties to
mediate. 3' Further, either party may move the court to refer the mat-
ter to mediation. 132 The parties may also voluntarily initiate media-
tion as an extension of the negotiating process. 33
The principal focus of this paper is on the initiation of mediation
through advance agreement, that is, through a compulsory mediation
clause in the oil and gas lease. Under such a clause the parties agree
in advance that future lease disputes will be referred to mediation
prior to either party initiating litigation. 34
128. LovENHrm, supra note 8, at 10.
129. LovENHEim, supra note 8, at 26.
130. See CPR-OrL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 5.
131. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.021-022 (West Supp. 1995).
132. Id.
133. The basic distinction is between "voluntary" mediation where the parties initiate the
process of their own volition and "mandatory" mediation where the process is initiated by court
order. See LEESON & JOHNSTON, supra note 9, at 135, 140.
134. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES-DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES-A GUIDE FOR
DRAFTERS OF BusuqwsS AGREEMENTS 1 (1994) [hereinafter CPR-DIsPUTE RESOLUTION
CLAUSES] (noting that "[b]y far the best time to agree on a sensible way to resolve a contractual
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B. Role of the Mediator
While the mediation process may get the parties to the table, it
does not necessarily get them there in a frame of mind to settle.
Skilled mediators strive to provide the impetus for settlement by alter-
ing the mind set of the disputants, changing the dynamics of negotia-
tions and helping the disputants find mutually acceptable solutions.135
The mediator's role can run the gamut from that of a mere
facilitator, who arranges meetings, provides a neutral setting and pas-
sively presides over the meetings to that of an activist who proposes
settlement terms and urges the parties to accept those terms.136 The
role mediators perform varies from mediator to mediator and from
dispute to dispute, but generally includes at least the following: (1)
they act as conveners, assisting the parties in defining the issues in
controversy and the terms and conditions under which they will nego-
tiate; (2) they act as brokers, conveying the concerns and ideas of one
party to the other, either in joint session or in separate confidential
sessions with the respective parties; and (3) they act as facilitators,
often suggesting alternative approaches or compromises which may
assist the parties in reaching agreement and bringing about a resolu-
tion to the dispute.' 37
While the mediator may assume a variety of other roles, the one
role he or she can never assume is that of judge. By definition, the
mediator, unlike the judge or arbitrator, has no power to impose an
outcome on the disputing parties. The mediator's sole function is to
assist parties in finding a solution of their own making. In most cases
successfully helping the parties to find a solution to a problem, which
they failed to do on their own for months or years is not an easy task
and involves much more than simply getting the parties to talk about
dispute is when the parties are negotiating their business agreement and before any dispute has
arisen").
135. The skillful mediator tries to get the disputants to change from regarding their business
dispute as a contest to be won or lost to a problem to be solved. Once this shift in attitude takes
place some of the hostility tends to defuse and the dynamics of the negotiation tend to change.
The parties and the mediator begin to exchange ideas and strive to invent creative solutions to
the problem. The dynamics of mediation foster settlement. See CPR-Busnmss DISPUTES,
supra note 10, at 13; CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 6.
136. See CPR-OiL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 6; see also CPR-Busnmss DisPUrS, supra
note 10, at 19 (providing a continuum of how large a role a mediator might assume in a given
dispute).
137. See Bruce S. Marks, Commercial Conflict Management and Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in the Oil and Gas Industry, THE Souw _sTEnN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF
mar FORTY-FRST INSTITUTE ON OIL ANm GAS TAXATION 9-46 (1990). See also WALTER MAG-
GIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION 91 (1985).
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their problem. The skilled mediator attempts to move the parties
from their fixed positions and help them find a solution to their dis-
pute. The techniques employed may include the following: (1) setting
an agenda and ground rules to govern the negotiations; (2) enhancing
and controlling communications between the parties, which might in-
clude carrying messages between the parties and helping them negoti-
ate; (3) helping the parties discover and better define the true issues
involved in the dispute; (4) helping each party understand the wants
and needs of the other party; (5) helping the parties understand the
facts and face the facts, sometimes creating an impetus to settle by
confidentially pointing out weaknesses in the positions of the respec-
tive parties; and (6) helping the parties develop and negotiate pro-
posed solutions.131
C. Overview of Mediation Techniques and Mediator Qualifications
There is no "best" way to mediate a dispute. Mediation tech-
niques vary with the mediator, the parties and the dispute. Likewise,
there is no right or wrong style of mediation, nor is there a definitive
checklist of qualifications an effective mediator must possess or tech-
niques that an effective mediator should employ. Similarly, there is
no set model defining the process. On the contrary, mediation is char-
acterized by its flexibility and takes shape in a variety of models. 39
Two attributes are, however, essential for all mediators. First, the me-
diator must earn the trust of the parties 140 and second, the mediator
must be a skilled listener.141
To attain trust, the mediator must be perceived by the parties as
absolutely fair, impartial, and free of any conflicts of interest. In addi-
tion, the mediator must convince the parties that he or she under-
stands their dispute, will keep their confidences, is capable of
understanding the law and the facts 42 and has the skill to guide them
to a negotiated settlement. Only after trust has been established will
138. See Lovwmnmni, supra note 8, at 35-36. See also CPR-BusinEss DispuTs, supra note
10, at 19.
139. See generally ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 121, at ch. 2; LOVENHEiM, supra note 8, at
33-46; TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 3.7.
140. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 121, at 11.
141. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 121, at 11.
142. One commentator, who has evaluated the need for referral to knowledgeable industry
experts in the context of gas contract dispute arbitrations, has noted the value of using duly
constituted state commissions:
[C]ontractual ratable take and drainage claims require significant factual development
and technical expertise.... A proceeding involving these types of claims at the [Texas
Railroad Commission's Oil and Gas Division,] is an administrative process... in many
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the parties be totally candid with the mediator, disclose their real in-
terests, and act on the mediator's suggestions.
The mediator must be an expert listener. He or she develops an
understanding of the dispute through careful listening. Further,
mediators are generally accorded confidence and respect only after
they convey to the parties the fact that they understand the essence of
both the dispute and the respective parties' concerns. Often this un-
derstanding is conveyed through empathetic or active listening, which
means listening for what the parties feel as well as to what they are
saying. The mediator conveys that he or she is listening empathicly
through verbal and nonverbal (i.e. eye contact and body language)
feedback that lets the parties know that the mediator understands and
respects their positions.143
Beyond earning trust and being expert listeners, mediators' tech-
niques and strategies vary as widely as do the mediators themselves
and the disputes which they mediate. Despite this diversity, both
scholars and experienced practitioners who have written about the
mediation process tend to agree that successful mediators tend to pos-
sess certain basic qualifications and tend to apply certain basic tech-
niques. This is not to imply that all techniques will be used in all
proceedings or that any single mediator will possess all of the qualifi-
cations listed. It is merely an effort to describe in generic terms, with-
out being exhaustive, the most common techniques and most sought
after qualities."
ways like arbitration. If questions of law requiring an understanding of state and fed-
eral regulations, such as proration rules, figure in ... [the] defenses . . ., arbitration
before individuals knowledgeable in the industry [may be preferable.]
Marks, supra note 137, at § 9.04[4] (quoting Bowman, Arbitration of the Gas Contract Dispute:
An Alternative to Litigation, NATuRAL GAS LTIGATION INsTITUTE (Oct. 11-12, 1988)).
143. ROGMS & SALEM, supra note 121, at 12-13.
144. STEPHEN B. GoLDBEao ET AL., DsptrE RESOLUTION 103 (2d ed. 1992). While even
summary treatment of these techniques and qualifications is beyond the scope of this paper, I
have set forth below two of the better checklists obtained from the vast array of literature on the
subject of how to mediate. The following is a checklist of the most commonly employed tech-
niques used by mediators:
(1) Encouraging exchanges of information and providing new information;
(2) Helping the parties understand one another's views;
(3) Letting the parties know that their concerns are understood;
(4) Promoting a productive level of emotional expression;
(5) Helping the parties to realistically assess the alternatives to settlement;
(6) Encouraging flexibility;
(7) Stimulating the parties to suggest creative settlement options;
(8) Learning about matters the parties are reluctant to disclose to each other;
9) Creating solutions that meet the fundamental needs of all parties.
Id.
The following is a checklist of qualifications for mediators of complex business disputes:
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D. Overview of the Steps in the Mediation Process
Just as there is no "best" way to mediate a dispute, there is no
standard model which dictates the steps in the mediation process. On
the contrary, mediation, a process characterized by its flexibility, takes
shape in a variety of models. 45 Nevertheless, in spite of variations,
some commonality exists and a general overview of the steps in the
process helps to illustrate how the mediation process works.'4 6
The Texas ADR Handbook describes mediation as a three-step
process.14 7 Others have described mediation as a six-step 48 and a
twelve-step149 process. On analysis, these descriptions are consistent
with one another. The variation in description merely reflects the fact
that the various steps in the process overlap and merge together. The
three-step process (which this paper uses for purposes of providing a
general overview of the mediation process) consists of the following:
(1) opening and explanation phase; (2) bargaining and negotiation
phase; and (3) closure.
During the opening and explanation phase, the mediator makes
an opening statement. In addition to defining the ground rules and
procedures the mediator seeks to create an atmosphere which fosters
(1) Perceived as absolutely impartial and fair,
(2) Capable of inspiring trust and confidence;
(3) Ability to assess people, understand their motives, and relate easily with them;
(4) Ability to maintain a tone of civility and consideration;
(5) Excellent listening skills;
(6) Capable of thoroughly understanding the law and facts of a dispute;
(7) Ability to analyze complex problems;
(8) Creativity, ingenuity, and imagination in developing viable proposals;
(9) Skills as a problem solver,
(10) Ability to be articulate and persuasive;
(11) Flexibility;
(12) Patience and persistence in the face of difficulties;
(13) A personal stature which commands respect;
(14) Experience as a mediator.
CPR-Busnmss DisPtEs, supra note 10, at 18. This checklist sets forth a rare combination of
qualities unlikely for any one mediator to possess. The size and complexity of the case will
influence the qualifications required. In a major case, the mediator will likely be a former judge,
a professor, a highly respected attorney, or a business executive, preferably with ADR experi-
ence and some knowledge of oil and gas.
145. See generally ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 121, at ch. 2; LoVENHEIM, supra note 8, at
33-46.
146. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 117, at 12.
147. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 47.
148. LOVENHEIM, supra note 8, at 103 (describing the six stages of a mediation hearing as (1)
mediator's opening statement, (2) disputants' opening statements, (3) discussion, (4) caucus, (5)
negotiation, and (6) closure).
149. CHRISTOPHER MooRE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEOIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICTS 25 (1986).
34
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss4/1
THE OIL & GAS LEASE AND ADR
trust, communication and cooperation. The skillful mediator will sub-
tly tout the benefits of mediation, such as the preservation of long-
term business relationships between the parties and the fact that me-
diation can yield agreements in which both parties win, as opposed to
the win/lose decisions of courts. The mere mention of court decisions
may be a sufficient hint that the dispute, if unresolved, may end in
court. The skillful mediator also uses the opening statement to begin
altering the mind set of the disputants from regarding their dispute as
a contest to be won or lost to a problem to be solved.150
Typically, following the mediator's opening statement, each party
makes an opening statement setting forth their respective side of the
dispute. The purpose of these opening statements is multifold. But
most importantly, it allows the mediator to begin to frame the issues
which will need to be addressed. An astute mediator often will be
able to discover both areas of concern and areas of agreement from
these opening statements.
After the opening statements are concluded, the mediator may
ask the parties further questions regarding the dispute in order to
elicit discussion. During this part of the process, the mediator's pri-
mary job is to listen. He or she should be particularly sensitive to
hidden agendas or other issues not discussed in the opening state-
ments. The parties should be allowed to "vent" their anger.151
During the bargaining and negotiation phase, the mediator meets
with the parties in joint sessions and also meets with each of the par-
ties in private sessions called caucuses.'5 2 There is no prescribed
formula that mandates how much of the negotiating is done in joint
session and how much is done in caucus where the mediator shuttles
between the parties in an effort to resolve the dispute. In caucuses the
principle of confidentiality is crucial. The mediator assures each party
that he or she will not reveal private information revealed during the
caucus without permission.
In both joint sessions and caucuses, the mediator listens and asks
questions designed to discover areas of concern and hidden agendas.
To mediate means "to go between" or "to be in the middle." Thus,
the term accurately describes what the mediator does. He or she goes
150. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 48.
151. "Venting" is a mediation term-of-art which describes a most important part of the pro-
cess. Unlike proscribed courtroom behavior, in mediation the parties are allowed to get angry
and express their anger. This is an important part of the settlement process in mediation.
152. "Caucus" is a mediation term-of-art which describes a separate and confidential meet-
ing between the mediator and one of the parties.
1995]
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between the parties to help them find a solution to their dispute. The
mediator elicits information. With information comes the power of
knowledge and the likelihood of finding areas of mutual agreement.
The mediator guides the parties in exploring all available alternatives
for settlement. 153
Once one or more potential solutions reach the table, the media-
tor attempts to channel the various proposals into a mutually accepta-
ble solution. If proposed solutions are offered during a caucus, the
mediator must ask the party's permission to share the solution with
the other side. Such proposals may deal with a party's alleged "bot-
tom-line" position. Often the proposals turn out to be mere postur-
ing. It may be necessary for the mediator to create an impetus to
settle by privately pointing out weakness in the positions of the re-
spective parties or to augment the proposals of the parties with sug-
gestions of his own."5
Closure occurs either when the parties reach an agreement or
when the mediator determines no agreement will be reached and that
further efforts to reach agreement would be futile. If no agreement is
reached the mediator should close the proceeding on the most posi-
tive note possible.
If the mediation is successful and an agreement has been reached,
closure entails committing that agreement to writing. The written
agreement, like everything else in the mediation proceeding, is the
work product of the disputants and the mediator. Many mediation
proceedings have bogged down at the eleventh hour because the par-
ties were unable to agree on language describing a settlement that
they had verbally agreed to earlier.' 55
The task of writing the agreement is not unlike that of drafting a
contract or a settlement agreement in unstructured direct negotia-
tions. The contract analogy is particularly appropriate because, if one
153. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 49.
154. Suggestions by the mediator must be made very carefully, since it is desirable that the
settlement be the parties' rather than the mediator's. Suggestions by the mediator must be as
neutral as possible to avoid any hint of bias. The mediator may offer several possible solutions
for each diifficult point, allowing the parties to choose, or better yet, plant the seed so that the
disputants may discover the optimum solution themselves.
155. TEXAS ADR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 50; LovENHmm, supra note 8, at 104-17.
[Vol. 30:599
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of the parties does not live up to the agreement reached in media-
tion, 56 the other party's remedy is an action for breach of contract. 57
E. Desirability of Mediation-Business and Practical
Considerations
The types of disputes that typically arise between lessors and les-
sees under the oil and gas lease would seem to readily lend themselves
to resolution through mediation. One would assume that oil compa-
nies, which typically prepare the leases, would encourage the use of
mediation'58 and routinely insert mediation clauses into their leases.
However, few domestic oil and gas leases today have such clauses and,
aside from court annexed mediation or arbitration and international
situations, ADR is not often used in the oil and gas industry. 59
Can the absence of ADR clauses be attributed to fear that such
clauses would cause a company to lose deals? In other words, would a
compulsory ADR clause cause a prospective lessor not to lease to a
company, which offers a lease with a compulsory ADR clause but
rather lease to a competitor, who offers substantially the same deal
without such a clause?
Probably not in most cases. 6 ° If the bonus and the royalty are
competitive, a compulsory ADR clause would cause the loss of few, if
any, agreements. If problems arose, an ADR clause would simply be
another element to negotiate at the time the lease is signed. 6'
156. To the limited extent such statistics are available, they show that in the overwhelming
majority of cases the parties voluntarily comply with agreements reached in mediation proceed-
ings. In fact, it has been statistically shown that parties are more likely to comply with the terms
of a mediation agreement than to abide by a court order. See LovENHEIM, supra note 8, at 110,
Ch. 1.
157. LovENHrm, supra note 8, at 110. See also Ames v. Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590,591 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds (holding agreement reached in mediation proceeding to be
enforceable as a contract).
158. Generally, the oil company is also much more likely to be the defendant rather than the
plaintiff in cases arising under the lease.
159. This writer has never seen a compulsory ADR clause in a domestic oil and gas lease.
While I have looked for empirical studies to determine the frequency in which ADR is used in
the oil and gas industry, I was unable to find any such studies and have been advised by reliable
sources that no such studies exist. A number of random calls to oil and gas practitioners and
mediators have confirmed my impression that, except in international cases, ADR clauses are
not frequently used in the oil & gas industry-either in leases or contracts. Such clauses are
occasionally found in domestic contracts but almost never in domestic oil & gas leases.
160. None of the oil and gas practitioners I talked to on the telephone felt the presence of a
compulsory ADR clause would cause a significant number of deals to be lost.
161. Like a pooling clause, a Pugh clause or a continuous operations clause. See supra part
II.B.
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Why aren't compulsory ADR clauses found in more domestic
leases? Is it simple inertia or is there some considered business or
legal reason that dissuades oil company's from putting compulsory
mediation clauses in their domestic oil and gas leases and contracts? 162
VI. THE USE OF MEDIATION IN RESOLVING LEssoRILEssEE
DISPUTES
A. Types of Lessor/Lessee Disputes
In broadest outline the principal types of disputes which arise be-
tween lessors and lessees under an oil and gas lease are as follows: (1)
surface use disputes; (2) lease termination disputes; (3) disputes in-
volving the payment of royalties; (4) disputes involving pooling; and
(5) disputes involving the implied covenants.
Surface use disputes can be quite intensive and can negatively
impact the relationship between lessor and lessee, far beyond the eco-
nomic impact of the dispute. 163  Surface use cases usually turn on is-
sues such as whether the lessee's use of the surface was negligent,
reasonable, in accordance with the accommodation doctrine, 164 re-
lated to minerals under the leased property or was in accordance with
the terms of the lease, statutes, and ordinances.
The controlling legal issues in lease termination cases differ de-
pending on whether the alleged termination occurred while the lease
was in its primary or secondary term. If termination is alleged to have
occurred during the primary term, the issues will likely involve either
proper payment of delay rentals or the commencement of operations
for drilling. If termination is alleged to have occurred during the sec-
ondary term, the controlling issues will likely focus on whether there
162. With the rapid growth of ADR in the business community many commercial contracts
now contain ADR clauses. See CPR-BusrNEss DisPuTs, supra note 10, at 9, Exhibit D (listing
a number of types of business disputes which have been successfully resolved by mediation).
Two industries in which ADR is extensively used are real estate sales and securities. In the real
estate sales industry disputes between agents and clients are often arbitrated or mediated. In the
securities industry almost all disputes involving brokerage firms are arbitrated-not only dis-
putes between brokers and customers but also disputes between brokerage firms and employees.
See Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club, Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt with a Sex-
Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al.
163. See supra part IV.A.
164. Under the accommodation doctrine, if the proposed use by the mineral owner will sub-
stantially impair existing uses of the surface owner and the mineral owner has reasonable alter-
natives available, then the mineral owner must accommodate the surface owner's use. See Getty
Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d. 808
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was production in paying quantities or whether one or more of the
lease savings clauses was satisfied. 65
Royalty disputes typically involve the payment of royalties on gas
rather than oil. There are a number of subcategories of such disputes.
Most of these subcategories revolve around the following questions:
How is royalty calculated? (Otherwise known as the market value-
proceeds problem). 66 Are royalty owners entitled to share in take or
pay settlements? 167 How do division orders effect the payment of
royalties? 168
The controlling legal issues in disputes involving pooling typically
turn on whether the pooling was done strictly in accordance with the
terms of the lease pooling clause 169 and whether the pooling was done
in good faith.170
The controlling legal issues in cases involving implied covenants
usually boil down to questions of whether the lessee acted as a reason-
able prudent operator. The test is whether the lessee acted in good
165. See supra part II.B.2.a-b.
166. The market value-proceeds problem arises when gas producers enter into long term
contracts with suppliers. The typical situation involves A, owner of Blackacre, who twenty years
earlier executed an oil and gas lease with lessee. Lessee makes a long term contract for the sale
of gas at $0.10 per Mcf on which A's one-eighth royalty is based. Years later B, A's neighbor,
executes an oil and gas lease and is able to sell his gas to the same gas producer for $3.00 per
Mcf. A, hearing of B's good fortune, promptly sues the lessee to have his royalties computed on
the market value or market price of his gas (although the gas producer is only receiving $0.10 per
Mcf for A's gas). David L. Hancock, The Gas Producer's Dilemma: Royalty Clauses and Long
Term Gas Purchase Contract, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 517 (1985).
Texas and Oklahoma follow opposite rules on this point. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,
429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). The Vela, or Texas, rule is followed in the majority of states. See,
e.g., Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1005 (1985). Cf Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). A
minority of states follow the Tara or Oklahoma rule. See, eg., Hillard v Stephens, 637 S.W.2d
581 (Ark. 1982).
167. A take or pay clause, contained in a gas sales contract, commits the purchaser of natural
gas (generally a pipeline) to purchase, or "take," a minimum amount of natural gas from the
lessee or else pay for the gas not taken. Royalties collected on such payments might represent a
significant amount of revenue to the lessor. When there is a gas shortage, such a clause helps
assure the pipeline that there will be adequate gas. When there is a glut of natural gas however,
the pipeline may have to pay for gas that it does not take. In such times, the pipeline may offer
to settle at a lower rate than originally agreed upon in lieu of breaching the contract altogether.
The question arises as to what if anything the lessor is due on the settlement money for gas not
taken. James E. Prince, Production, Production, What is Production? Diamond Shamrock v.
Hodel, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1333. See also Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir.
1991); Killman Oil v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied.
168. See Exxon Corp. v. Middelton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Gavenda v. Strata Energy,
Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986). See also TEx. NAT. Ras. CODE ANN. § 91.401 (West 1994).
169. See, e.g., Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965); Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref.
Co., 84 P.2d 1106 (Okla. 1938).
170. See Imes, 84 P.2d at 1106; Amoco v. Underwood, 558 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
writ refd. nmr.e.; Elliott v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refd. n.r.e.
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faith, as a competent oil man, and with due regard for the interests of
the lessor.171
B. Models Illustrating the Use of Mediation in Resolving Lessor/
Lessee Disputes
Within the general framework outlined above, the actual disputes
that might arise under an oil and gas lease are many and varied. My
main purpose in listing the types of disputes was to lay a foundation
for illustrating how mediation can be used to resolve typical lessor/
lessee disputes. That will be illustrated through two hypothetical ex-
amples-one, involving a surface damage dispute and the other a
lease termination dispute.
1. Surface Damage Dispute
Aggressive Oil Co. has an oil and gas lease on 300 acres owned by
farmer Jones. Seismic tests convinced Aggressive that Jones' farm was
an excellent prospect for exploration and Aggressive began making
preparations to drill a well on the property. A crew foreman went to
inspect the proposed well site late one afternoon. He left after dark.
Since he was in a hurry to get home, he cut across Jones' pasture to
get to the main road. Along the way, he ran over Jones' prize bull.
Jones confronted the foreman, who told Jones not to worry about
that bull. He said: "Old man you'll soon be making so much money
off your oil royalties that you'll forget all about your stupid cattle."
Jones demanded payment. The foreman said I'll tell the people at the
office but, he never informed Aggressive about the accident. When
Jones heard nothing relative to payment for his bull, he contacted a
local lawyer, who has sent Aggressive a demand letter, in which he
threatens to file suit for damages of $50,000 as well as cancellation of
the lease.
Assuming that Aggressive and Jones signed a lease similar to the
one attached as Exhibit A, the lessee has a right to reasonable use of
all of the surface of Jones' farm for exploration and/or production.
The legal standard is negligence. The foreman was not limited by law
to driving just on roads. However, as in most accident cases, factual
issues abound. Was driving through the pasture negligence? Was it
within the course and scope of the foreman's employment? Was the
171. See supra part II.D; see also Amoco v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
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foreman's collision with the bull negligently caused or was it an una-
voidable accident? If negligence can be shown, is it grounds for termi-
nation of the lease or is Jones limited to damages?
As a legal matter Jones' case is not an easy one on grounds of
either reasonable use or negligence and it is highly unlikely that reci-
sion of the lease would be an available remedy. On the other hand,
venue lies in farmer Jones' home county and his neighbors on the jury
are likely to be highly sympathetic toward the local farmer's claim
against the "rich oil company" from afar.
Jones believes that Aggressive has refused to pay for his bull.
Further, in his mind, their refusal to acknowledge and apologize for
the accident adds insult to injury. He is a farmer and proud of it.
Even if he becomes a millionaire from royalties on production from
his land, he still intends to farm and raise cattle. In his mind, if royal-
ties make his children rich that will be great, but he is too old to
change his lifestyle. He feels that Aggressive has made light of his
lifestyle and has been insulting and condescending. He no longer
wants to do business with them. He wants them off his land and is
prepared to padlock the gate. While originally he probably would
have settled for $10,000, which is slightly more than his dead bull is
worth, he now wants to be rid of Aggressive and to collect the $50,000
to "teach them a lesson."
Aggressive is flabbergasted when they receive the demand letter.
They had no knowledge of the accident and barely know Jones. The
Jones Lease is one of their best prospects. Further, it is a lease bear-
ing one-eighth royalty, which has increased in value. Today leases in
the area are going for royalties of one-sixth or three-sixteenths.
Whether the foreman had been negligent or not, they would have
been happy to pay Jones the $10,000 his bull was worth, just to keep
him happy. Today, they would probably pay double that amount.
However, they are not about to stand for being padlocked out of the
property and are prepared to bring legal action for injunction and for
damages against Jones for obstruction. A rig has been hired and is
scheduled to move to the Jones property next week. Further, they feel
a demand for $50,000 is beyond reason and fear that if word of such
payment gets out other farmers in the county will try to "hold them
up" for similar settlements.
Within the framework of formal legal proceedings, many of the
above details and misconceptions might not come to light at all and, if
they came to light, it might take a long time as the slow and arduous
1995]
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legal process unfolds. By contrast, all these facts and details would
likely be drawn out by a skilled mediator during the first session.
Once all the facts are on the table, it is clear that what we have is
a misunderstanding that has gotten out of hand and that a simple
apology from Aggressive and the foreman will go a long way toward
solving the problem. In addition, Aggressive should affirm that the
company respects Jones' lifestyle and property without being conde-
scending. They may make this point by promising that their crews will
be especially careful and respectful of his land and livestock and by
referring to him as a partner in the well about to be drilled on his
property. 72 If Jones feels that Aggressive is sincere, that coupled with
a generous (but not outlandish) payment for his bull might resolve the
dispute. This is essentially all Jones wanted and what the Company
was willing to do in the first place. Even if Aggressive has to pay a
small "boot" to Jones for his aggravation ($20,000 rather than
$10,000), such a settlement might make sense in light of the foreman's
lack of judgement in dealing with the incident and Aggressive's inter-
est in fostering future relations with Jones.'73 Further the settlement
is confidential and thus limits Aggressive's exposure to other claims
based on the precedent of this settlement.
Even if Aggressive feels that the facts support their position on
the issues of negligence and reasonable use, they would be well ad-
vised (and most skilled mediators would so advise them if necessary)
not to push for a judicial decision on these issues. First of all, they
might lose before a hometown jury at the trial level and have to go
through an appeal. Second, even if they win, the cost of the litigation
would probably be greater than the cost of the bull. Finally, alienating
Jones hurts the long term relationship and is not in Aggressive's best
interest.
From Jones' standpoint, assume he has been bitten by the bug
called greed, and now wants more than the $10,000 to $20,000 plus an
apology for which he would have originally settled. He also has many
incentives to compromise. He could be convinced that he might ulti-
mately lose the case. Even if he wins a damage award at the trial
level, it might not stand up on appeal. It is unlikely that he could
172. They might also show him their plans to build an access road to the proposed well-site
and offer to build a cattle guard.
173. Possible areas for compromise might include not only the cash payment, but also in-
creasing the royalty from one-eighth to one-sixth or a combination of the two. If Jones is look-
ing for a non-monetary expression of good faith, firing the foreman who caused the problem by
his lack of judgment in dealing with Mr. Jones might be an available solution.
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rescind the lease and thus might have to live with a hostile lessee on
his property for many years. Finally, while the case is in litigation,
Aggressive might defer drilling, thus causing substantial delay in be-
ginning the income stream from royalties on the production which
Jones anticipates.
The solutions suggested above may seem simplistic. Still, they
demonstrate many of the advantages of mediation-opening the chan-
nels of communication, fashioning remedies which courts cannot pro-
vide, confidentially and fostering rather than destroying long term
relationships. If this matter is decided by litigation, either Jones will
receive no compensation for his bull and continue to have a company
he despises operating on his land, or Aggressive might be stuck with a
judgment for five times the value of the bull and conceivably might
even lose its lease. Litigation can only yield win/lose solutions. Medi-
ation can create solutions where both parties win. Finally, anyone
who believes that intangibles, such as an apology, are not sometimes
effective in helping to resolve disputes of this kind, has little or no
experience in mediation or negotiations.
2. Lease Termination Dispute
Beta Oil Company, Inc. leases a 120 acre tract of land
("Greenacre") near Giddings, Texas, from Mr. Green under an oil and
gas lease which bears a one-eighth royalty. In 1984, Beta drilled a well
called the Green Number One on Greenacre.17 4 The Green Number
One produced substantial quantities of oil and gas over the next sev-
eral years and has long since paid out. In September, 1992, the Green
Number One ceased to produce due to mechanical difficulties, but as
a result of reworking over the next three months, the well resumed
production in late December, 1992. Following resumption of produc-
tion, the well produced at a much lower rate. Beta's records show that
the well had a net operating loss for the year 1993, when depreciation
174. Assume that the Green Number One is the only production from Greenacre. The fact
that the Green Number One is an Austin Chalk well is relevant to this problem. The Austin
Chalk formation has limited porosity and permeability. Generally, this formation has sufficient
porosity and permeability only in areas where ancient faults caused fractures. To get production,
wells must intersect with these fractures. Assume the spacing is 80 acre and that a nearby well
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on the pump jack and other operating equipment is taken into ac-
count.175 Operations for the first six months of 1994 show a net loss
on a cash flow basis.
Beta began drilling horizontal wells in the Giddings (Austin
Chalk) Field in 1991 and has reentered some of its older vertical wells
and drilled horizontal wells with mixed but generally favorable re-
sults. 17 6 Beta has other acreage adjoining Greenacre under lease and
considers the Green Number One a good prospect for a re-entry hori-
zontal well.177 A competitor, Omega Oil Co., apparently feels the
same way. It has offered to lease Greenacre if Mr. Green can termi-
nate his lease with Beta. Omega has offered Mr. Green a lease bonus
of $300 per acre and a 1/6 royalty. That offer is attractive to Mr.
Green, whose royalty income from the Green Number One has de-
clined to about one-tenth of what it once was. He has hired an attor-
ney, who has written Beta a letter threatening to bring suit to quiet
title. The letter alleges that Beta's lease on Greenacre has terminated
due to a cessation of production and seeks to review Beta's financial
records.
Assuming that Beta and Green signed a lease similar to the one
attached as Exhibit A, the lease speaks only of "production." How-
ever, the courts read the term production to mean "production in pay-
ing quantities.' 1 78
Paying quantities is defined through a two-pronged test.179 First,
a so called litmus or accounting test-an objective test which looks
backwards-asks if operating revenues exceed operating costs over a
reasonable period of time, without regard to recovery of drilling
costs.180 Second, a so-called reasonable prudent operator or legal
175. On a cash flow basis the well broke even for the year 1993, but lost a small amount of
money during the second half of that year.
176. A horizontal well is a well that deviates from the vertical, by use of special directional
drilling equipment and is drilled horizontally to penetrate a number of fractures in a formation.
This method of drilling is considerably more expensive than vertical drilling but in many cases it
has substantially increased production. Horizontal drilling has been particularly successful in the
Giddings (Austin Chalk) and the Pearsall (Austin Chalk) fields in Texas. See B. Ray Holifield,
An Insider's Iew: What Really Happens in Horizontal Well Drilling, ADvANcEtD OIL & GAS
INSTrTuTE, SouTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW (1991).
177. Generally, horizontal wells are of two types-new wells (grassroots) and re-entry wells
(where existing vertical wells are reentered). Id. at 1.
178. See supra note 26.
179. See supra note 26.
180. The courts are not in agreement on a number of accounting issues, which are critical to
this test. For example, questions arise concerning distinctions between revenues and returns of
capital. See, e.g., Pshigoda v. Texaco, 703 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), writ refd, n.r.e..
Courts have also addressed whether amounts paid as royalties and overriding royalties are
chargeable against revenues. See e.g., Cowden v. General Crude Oil, 217 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ.
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test-a subjective test which looks forward-asks whether a reason-
able prudent operator would continue operating the lease with a rea-
sonable expectation of making a profit and not for mere speculation.
The party urging termination of the lease must win both prongs
of the test to terminate the lease. That party also has the burden of
proof. As in our example, the party urging termination will almost
always be the lessor and these are not easy cases for lessors to win.
181
The lessor must meet the first prong of the paying quantities test
with evidence usually consisting of the lessee's financial books and
records, which the lessor must usually obtain through subpoena and
expert testimony.'82 If this prong of the test shows an operating profit
for the period in question, no matter how small, the case is over-
summary judgment will be rendered for the lessee.
If the lessor can show an operating loss over a reasonable period
of time," 3 the lessor does not necessarily win, but he can defeat a
motion for summary judgment and get to the jury. To win this prong
of the test the lessor must convince the jury that a reasonable and
prudent operator expecting to make a profit and not merely seeking
to hold the lease for speculation would not continue to operate at a
loss under the circumstances.'84
The Beta Oil Company scenario is a classic example of a situation
where the parties may have differing assessments of the law and/or the
App. 1948). They have also addressed whether depreciation and administrative expenses are
deductible costs. See eg., Bales v. Delhi-Taylor, 362 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), writ refd,
n.r.e.; Sullivan & Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Patton v. Rogers, 417
S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), writ refd. n.r.e.; Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas
Co., 695 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ refd n.r.e.; Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604
P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979).
181. The paying quantities test is obviously heavily weighted in favor of the lessee, which
makes sense in terms of policy and economics. At this point the lessee has an investment in the
well, has taken the risk, and has paid all the costs. If the court is wrong the lessor will get a
windfall-namely, ownership of a well capable of producing in paying quantities.
182. Like the courts, experts often disagree as to what revenues and expenses must be taken
into account and what constitutes a reasonable period of time.
183. Operating costs must exceed operating revenues over a reasonable period of time. As
with the other elements of the litmus test what constitutes a reasonable time for unprofitability is
not clear. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959) (indicating that there is no
bright line fixed period and that a relatively long period is necessary to give a true financial
picture). But see Sullivan & Garnett, 308 S.W.2d at 891 (discussing a period of only six months).
Many lawyers counsel in terms of at least a year to allow for fluctuations and booking of particu-
lar expenses and revenues, but there is no judicial holding to that effect.
184. See, e.g., Bell v. Mitchell Energy, 553 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), no writ, Barby
v. Singer, 648 P.2d 14 (Okla. 1982). The factors taken into account in making this factual deter-
mination include the following: (1) the extent of the losses-small or large; (2) impending
shortages-likelihood of price increases; (3) geological potential- possibilities of reworks,
deeper formations or secondary recovery procedures; (4) the possibility, suggested in the exam-
ple, of replacing the vertical well with a horizontal well.
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facts and where a mediator might facilitate a resolution of the dispute
by helping the parties to better assess the strengths and weaknesses of
their respective positions. The mediator might begin by convincing
the lessor that his burden in this type of case is hard to meet. Factual
as well as legal doubts are typically resolved in favor of the lessee
because policy, economics, and equities are all on the side of the
lessee in this type of dispute.
This is not the type of case that courts are particularly well
equipped to decide. While courts are well equipped to impartially re-
solve disputes by weighing the facts and applying the law, and by ap-
plying appropriate procedures and rules of evidence, they are not
necessarily knowledgeable in areas of finance, accounting and busi-
ness planning. Furthermore, courts are only able to grant certain rem-
edies, such as award money damages, issue injunctions, or decree
specific performance. In disputes such as the Beta Oil Company sce-
nario, forward looking business solutions, which are beyond a court's
power to provide, are more appropriate. 185 Accordingly, many of the
matters heretofore discussed might come into play in this case. The
parties have a continuing relationship that has extended over a period
of ten years. The quality of that relationship will bear significantly on
the parties' ability to resolve this dispute. 8 6 The parties will likely
want to retain control over the matter and work toward a forward
looking business solution.18 7
There are certain concessions the lessee may be convinced to
make. Its willingness to make concessions will depend on the strength
of the lessor's case. For example, assume that the lessee's books and
records show that over the past year the Green Number One operated
at a modest loss. This means the lessor could get past a motion for
summary judgement and get to the jury. While from the facts given it
appears the lessee has a strong case under the second prong of the
paying quantities test, 88 it is impossible to predict jury verdicts with
any degree of certainty. If these are the facts, in order to hold the
lease the lessee might be convinced to raise the royalty from one-
185. See CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12, at 3-5.
186. Does Green feel Beta has been a good operator? If so, he may prefer to stick with Beta
rather than begin a relationship with a new operator. Here the nature and history of the 10 year
relationship will have a big impact on the parties' ability to settle., The more satisfactory that
relationship has been, the less inclined the lessor will be to want to terminate the lease.
187. See supra part IV.C-D.
188. Subjective, good faith expectations of future profits are the key. Evidence pertaining to
horizontal drilling plans and the desire of Beta's competitor Omega appears quite strong.
[Vol. 30:599
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eighth to one-sixth and to offer Green a firm commitment to drill a
horizontal well within a stated time period.
On the other hand, if Beta's books show that it made an operat-
ing profit, though a small one, over the period in question, Beta may
be less inclined to grant concessions. However, even in that case,
since it already intends to drill a horizontal well on the property, a
firm commitment to do so by a date certain may be offered by way of
compromise. Under these facts the mediator's best approach might
be to convince Green that he has little likelihood of surviving a mo-
tion for summary judgment. The main point illustrated by this prob-
lem is that mediation helps the parties to evaluate the strengths and
weakness of their cases and that forward looking solutions, which may
be win/win situations for both sides from a business standpoint, can
surface when the parties retain control over the resolution to their
dispute.
VII. COMPULSORY MEDIATION CLAUSE
A. A Suggested Form of Clause
The following is a form of compulsory mediation clause, which
calls for good faith mediation prior to institution of litigation:
Prior to instituting litigation, the parties will attempt in good faith to
resolve any controversy or claim arising out of, in connection with
or relating to this lease by mediation. Such mediation will be con-
ducted by a mediator chosen by agreement of the parties or duly
appointed by the American Arbitration Association in accordance
with the Commercial Mediation Rules of such association then in
effect. The cost of mediation shall be shared equally by the lessor
and lessee. If the matter has not been resolved pursuant to the
aforesaid mediation procedure within sixty days of the commence-
ment of such procedure (which period may be extended by mutual
agreement), either party may initiate litigation.
The clause could be modified or refined in a number of ways.
Other possibilities include a three-step clause calling for negotiation,
mediation and then binding arbitration. Specific clauses range from
simple "negotiate-in-good-faith" clauses to elaborate systems provid-
ing for mediation, mini-trial or expert fact-finding, sometimes in con-
junction with binding arbitration or other adjudicative procedures.1 8 9
189. See CPR-DIspurIE RESOLUTrON CLAusEs, supra note 134. CPR sets forth the form of
a number of clauses which can be used in various combinations. It recommends that in drafting
a specific clause for a specific agreement the parties consider including provisions that reflect the
three successive stages of resolution of business disputes-negotiation (a provision requiring
1995]
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B. Administrative Support Structure
The above clause names the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") as the organization to appoint the mediator and to adminis-
ter the mediation process.190 The mention of the AAA was included
to illustrate that in addition to a mediation clause and mediators, an
administrative support structure is also required for the mediation
process to function.' 9' In other words, there must be an organization
which maintains a database of qualified mediators, establishes stan-
dards and procedures, monitors conflicts of interests, appoints
mediators, administers the process, and monitors results and perform-
ances.' 2 Two possibilities exist relative to a support structure in con-
nection with mandatory ADR clauses in oil and gas leases. One is, of
course, to name AAA, JAMS, CPR or some similar existing organiza-
tion, with an infrastructure in place as the administrative organization.
The other alternative would be for the oil and gas industry to develop
its own organization for appointing mediators and administering its
cases. 93 Today, there are a number of national, regional and local
organizations which provide support services for ADR.
C. Enforcement of Dispute Resolution Clauses
Unlike arbitration clauses, which are specifically made enforcea-
ble by federal' 94 and state statutes,195 enforcement of nonarbitral
ADR clauses generally has not been addressed by statute. Thus, it is
not certain whether a clause calling for non-binding mediation prior to
negotiations between executives with decision-making authority); non-binding resolution (a pro-
vision requiring some form of non-binding dispute resolution, such as mediation) and binding
resolution (an adjudication procedure, such as binding arbitration). The various parts can be put
together in any combination that suits the parties' needs.
190. The American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), a not-for-profit organization, is the
oldest and by far the largest of ADR providers, having handled approximately 64,000 cases last
year. There are numerous other ADR providers, both for-profit and not-for-profit. The two
largest for-profit ADR providers, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ("JAMS"), an
organization whose mediators and arbitrators consist of retired judges, and Endispute recently
merged. Together, these two organizations handled about 17,000 cases last year. See BusInsS
LAw TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 44.
191. Mediators alone are no more able to provide all of the necessary turn-key services
needed to resolve disputes than are judges alone able, without the supporting court systems, to
perform the entire judicial function.
192. See CPR-Busrqzss DisptrEs, supra note 10, at 22.
193. Some industries support the mediation process via extensive "in-house" or "industry
supported" dispute resolution mechanisms, which maintain lists of qualified mediators. Exam-
ples include real estate trade associations and securities self regulatory organizations such as the
New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.
194. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
195. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.001-073 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §8 801-18 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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institution of litigation is enforceable. Although several lower courts
have enforced agreements to mediate future disputes, the case law on
this issue is sparse.
Some commentators have argued against enforceability, basing
their arguments on the voluntary nature of the mediation process and
the difficulty of fashioning an appropriate remedy.196 Unlike binding
arbitration, mediation offers no certainty that the dispute will be re-
solved. Thus some have argued that an agreement to mediate is noth-
ing more than an agreement to try in good faith to resolve a dispute.
They reason that if one party is determined not to settle, nothing is
gained by forcing that party to mediate. Under this line of reasoning,
when one party breaches an agreement to mediate by instituting liti-
gation, the other party's position is not worsened in a way that can be
redressed by measurable damages or specific performance because
the breach merely results in the same litigation that would have oc-
curred absent the breach. That argument is buttressed by the maxim
that equity will not compel a futile or ineffective act.
Paradoxically, however, this line of reasoning, which purports to
be rooted in the nature of the process, rests on a fundamental miscon-
ception about the process. When one understands the mediation pro-
cess and adopts a process-oriented definition of mediation these
arguments are effectively countered. 197 Mediation is a process which
facilitates settlement. It is not a process that guarantees settlement in
all cases. To the contrary, the mediation process generally assumes
that at the onset the parties are unwilling to settle. Because one or
both parties do not want to settle, does not mean settlement will not
occur. It logically follows from this process-oriented definition that a
court can enforce a compulsory ADR clause in the same manner in
which courts enforce contracts generally. 198 In the event of breach,
the court can fashion an appropriate remedy-either damages or spe-
cific performance.
Existing authority, though sparse, supports the proposition that
compulsory mediation clauses are enforceable by the courts. In Texas,
both by statute' 99 and under the case law,20 a court may on its own
196. See generally Welch, supra note 61, at 128-132.
197. Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing An ADR Clause-Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 AM.
Bus. L.J. 575 (1988).
198. Enforcement means enforcing the parties' agreement to participate in good faith in a
settlement process, not imposing a settlement.
199. Trx. Clv. PRAc & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021 (West Supp. 1995).
200. Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex Ct. App. 1992).
1995]
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motion order mediation. The Decker case was an action for manda-
mus where a relator sought to have the Court of Appeals instruct the
trial judge to lift her order ordering the parties to mediate.2 °' The
Court of Appeals held that, even though one or both of the parties
believe the dispute to be unresolvable except by litigation, the trial
court may nevertheless order mediation on its own motion.202
Ultimately, questions regarding the enforceability of agreements
to mediate are of more academic than practical interest. Although
agreements to mediate are probably enforceable, it is unlikely that a
party would sue to enforce such an agreement, except under unusual
circumstances. As discussed herein, settlement of disputes through
negotiation, either assisted by third parties or not, is a voluntary pro-
cess. Courts cannot force the parties to settle their disputes. At most
it can force them to try. If the parties meet and discuss their differ-
ences, the good faith standard would probably be met, even though
neither party moves from its original position. In practice, a finding of
bad faith would probably require showing complete refusal to negoti-
ate20 3 or something like a "smoking gun" memo clearly indicating bad
faith.204
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that most disputes between lessors and lessees
lend themselves to resolution through mediation,0 5 the oil and gas
industry has been slow to embrace mediation as a means for resolving
such disputes.20 6 The reason is not apparent to this writer, but the
best evidence points to simple inertia. It is time for oilmen and their
attorneys to take another look at their lease forms20 7 and remind
themselves that the oil and gas lease became what it is today through
evolution responsive to the needs of the industry. In addition, they
should develop a familiarity with and an understanding of the ADR
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Examples include refusal to meet, refusal to abide by the rules, refusal to make an
opening statement, or leaving before the mediator declares an impasse.
204. For example, statements to the effect that "I will sit there if they make me but I will not
settle under any circumstances, nor will I listen to a word the other party says."
205. See supra Part IV.
206. See CPR-OIL AND GAS, supra note 12.
207. Although outside the scope of this paper, the same principle applies to contracts used in
the oil and gas industry, not just leases. An ADR clause may also be appropriate for farmout
agreements, joint operating agreements and numerous other types of agreements used in the
industry. CPR-OIL & GAS, supra note 12, at 2-5.
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process, which in the 1980s and 1990s has emerged as a powerful tool
for resolving business related disputes.
This reevaluation should lead to the inevitable conclusion that it
is time for the oil and gas lease to evolve a little more-namely be
changed to add a compulsory ADR clause.20 8 Such a clause will not
resolve each and every dispute between lessors and lessees, but it
probably will keep many such disputes from reaching the courthouse.
It will also enable the parties to retain greater control over resolution
of their disputes, to devise solutions that make sense from a business
as well as a legal perspective, and to structure settlements in ways
courts cannot. Appropriate use of ADR procedures will also result in
savings of time and money and will help foster the relationship be-
tween lessors and lessees.
ADR and the oil and gas lease-it's a marriage made in heaven
and it's time for it to happen.
208. The clause suggested above is minimal, the intention being a generic example. Clearly,
there are any number of ways the clause could be improved or adapted to fit specific situations.
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APPENDix B
Dated December 30, 1857
Deed Book P, p. 357
$1 in hand.
Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company
to
E. B. Bowditch and E. L. Drake
'Demise and let' all the lands owned or held
under lease by said company in the County of
Vanango, State of Pennsylvania, 'To bore, dig,
mine, search for and obtain oil, salt water,
coal and all materials existing in and upon
said lands, and take, remove and sell such,
etc., for their own exclusive use and benefit,
for the term of 15 years, with the privilege
of renewal for same term. Rental, one-eighth
of all oil as collected from the springs in
barrels furnished or paid for by lessees.
Lessees may elect to purchase said one-eighth
at 45 cents per gallon, but such election,
when made, shall remain fixed. On all other
minerals, 10 per cent of the net profits.
Lessees agree to prosecute operations as early
in the spring of 1858 as the season will
permit, and if they fail to work the property
for an unreasonable length of time, or fail to
pay rent for more than 60 days, the lease to
be null and void.'
By agreement dated February 12, 1858, and re-
corded in Deed Book P, p. 441, the above lease
is amended so that 12 cents for every gallon
of oil shall be in full of all other rental;
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